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AIMEE CONSTANTINEAU*
Debt collection has burgeoned into a thriving industry over the past decade,
and it is estimated to be a $13 billion dollar business today. Yet, most of the
35% of American adults who owe an average debt of $5000 do not even know
that a creditor is trying to collect the debt. In St. Louis, Missouri, over
100,000 judgments were handed down in debt collection lawsuits from 2008
to 2012, and the overwhelming majority of those lawsuits were against lowincome debtors. Collectively, these debtors lost over $50 million in wages
through garnishments, which often forced households into the unthinkable
position of allocating what few resources remained. And, more often than not,
such financial strain drives families even further into debt because they seek
out new loans to repay those debts.
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The debt-collection process in Missouri, from the initial complaint to the
garnishment of wages, is governed by a blend of federal and state law, both of
which are antiquated and non-comprehensive. This combination of laws fails to
provide low-income residents of St. Louis with constitutionally adequate notice or
an opportunity to be heard, thereby violating debtors’ procedural due
process rights. These violations lead to serious social and economic ramifications
for the low-income residents of St. Louis. To remedy these constitutional
shortcomings, lawmakers should provide for specially tailored notice requirements,
access to legal counsel or advice, and additional financial protections to safeguard
communities from the overly harsh practices of debt collectors.
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“[T]hey aren’t families that didn’t work hard enough or didn’t care.
They aren’t people who scoffed at paying their debts.” 1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario.2 You live in Jennings, Missouri,3 a
city situated just north of St. Louis. You are working at a job that pays
you $8.20 an hour4 when you need emergency surgery. Uninsured,
your hospital bill is over $10,000. Because your annual income is
under $20,000, you qualify for the hospital’s free care program; you
never apply for the exemption, however, because you have not heard
of the program, and the hospital does not tell you about it. Instead,
you negotiate a payment plan with the hospital’s collection agency,
making you the debtor, the hospital the creditor, and the hospital’s
collection agency the debt collector. After a few months, you default
on your payments in violation of the terms of the repayment plan,
and the collection agency files a debt collection lawsuit against you.
You appear at the court proceedings, but you do not have enough
savings to hire or consult with a lawyer. Without the aid of legal
representation, you do not really know what is supposed to happen.
The attorney for the debt collection agency takes you into the hallway
before the hearing and offers you new payment terms if you agree in
court to owing the debt. The offer seems reasonable to you, so you
agree to the terms. The court enters a judgment in favor of the
collection agency, thereby making you the judgment-debtor and the
collection agency the judgment-creditor. Because you make over
$870 a month, under federal law the collection agency can garnish
1. Editorial Board, Editorial: St. Louis Area’s Black Neighborhoods Hardest Hit by
Debt Lawsuits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/
news/opinion/editorial-st-louis-area-s-black-neighborhoods-hardest-hit-by/article_a
f033c9b-b575-5d4d-bb01-7cebb6b573ab.html.
2. The premise and facts of this hypothetical situation are derived from
circumstances described in Paul Kiel & Chris Arnold, From the E.R. to the Courtroom:
How Nonprofit Hospitals Are Seizing Patients’ Wages, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014, 6:00
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofit-hospitals-are-seizing-patients-wages.
3. The city of Jennings, Missouri has a population of approximately 15,000, a
median income of $27,785, and is 89.8% Black or African-American. QuickFacts for
Jennings City, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table
/PST045215/2937178 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
4. The current minimum wage in Missouri is $7.65 an hour. Minimum Wage,
MO. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS. RELATIONS, https://labor.mo.gov/DLS/MinimumWage
(last visited Nov. 30, 2016); see also Paul Kiel & Chris Arnold, Old Debts, Fresh Pain:
Weak Laws Offer Debtors Little Protection, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/old-debts-fresh-pain-weak-laws-offer-debtorslittle-protection.
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your pay by seizing 25% of it each week. This reduction in weekly
income brings your take-home pay below the minimum wage. A
month later, you fall ill again, return to the hospital, and find yourself
in the same exact position in the courtroom shortly thereafter. This
situation is alarmingly common for many residents of Missouri.
The city of Jennings has seen over 4500 debt-collection lawsuits
initiated against residents of the city in the past five years.5 And
Jennings is not alone in this struggle. According to a recent study by
ProPublica,6 a non-profit news organization, debt-collection suits
resulting in court judgments in favor of the debt collector
disproportionately affect low-income communities across the country,
and the study found that the effects are even more pronounced in
majority-black communities.7 In the St. Louis area in particular,
judgment rates peaked in low-income neighborhoods, and in many
cases majority-black, low-income neighborhoods saw an even higher
5. Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits Squeeze
Black Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/
debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods. Latanya Graves, who lives in
Jennings, talked about the lack of options she faced when she had to decide which
bill most warranted payment. Id. “Hoping that if [I] don’t pay this bill for a few
months and [the utility] doesn’t get cut off,” she “could see that as a safety net.” Id.
“It brings back a lot of memories, a lot of bad memories.” Id. Cori Winfield, also of
Jennings, had to decide between “keeping the gas on, finding a place to live, [or]
saving for another car” after her minivan was repossessed when she was sued
successfully by the subprime auto lender that was garnishing her wages to repay the
debt. Id. Stress and anxiety provide one explanation for the hesitancy of Jennings
community members to discuss openly the debt-collection suit affliction: “Employees
often find it humiliating, because the courts have had to intervene and employers
have become involved in their otherwise private struggles.” ADP RESEARCH INST.,
GARNISHMENT:
THE UNTOLD STORY 6 (2014) [hereinafter ADP REPORT],
http://www.adp.com/tools-and-resources/adp-research-institute/insights/~/media
/RI/pdf/Garnishment-whitepaper.ashx.
6. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (reporting on a study that was the first of its kind
and focused specifically on data from communities in and around three major
metropolitan areas: St. Louis, Missouri; Chicago, Illinois; and Newark, New Jersey).
The methodology of the study conducted on the disparity in debt-collection lawsuits
focused on the three cities over a five-year period (2008–2012), and it overlaid census
tract data on population, race, and income with judgment location data that allowed
the researchers to look at the probable income and race of debtors in the lawsuits. Id.
7. Arguably, low-income residents in majority-black communities in Missouri
have an Equal Protection claim because of the possible discriminatory effect against
classes of judgment-debtors due to both poverty and race, based on the volume of
judgments in collection suits that involve these two classes. The Equal Protection
argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. Cf. Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252, 257–58 (1959) (holding that a docket and filing fee required to commence
an appeal could not be applied to indigents under both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses).
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rate.8 Specifically, the study looked at over 100,000 judgments from
St. Louis City and County and found that 90% of those judgments fell
in lower income communities.9 Furthermore, over $50 million in
garnishments was collected from the judgment-debtors located in
those communities.10
When the rates of judgments and garnishments were broken down
by race while holding income constant, almost half of the judgments
fell in majority-black, lower income communities, and approximately
60% of the $50 million in garnishments was collected from judgmentdebtors located in those communities.11
ProPublica therefore
concluded the following:
(1) that debtors in majority-black
communities are more than twice as likely as income-equivalent
debtors living in majority white neighborhoods to have debt collectors
attempt to recover delinquent debts through legal action; and (2) that
debtors living in majority black neighborhoods are 20% more likely
than income-equivalent debtors living in white neighborhoods to have
their judgments satisfied through garnishments.12 ProPublica noted
that “[i]t is not unreasonable to attribute these perils to [racial]
discrimination,”13 but the study also pointed to other contributing
8. See ANNIE WALDMAN & PAUL KIEL, PROPUBLICA, RACIAL DISPARITY IN DEBT
COLLECTION LAWSUITS: A STUDY OF THREE METRO AREAS 1, 6, 26 (2015),
https://static.propublica.org/projects/race-and-debt/assets/pdf/ProPublica-garnish
ments-whitepaper.pdf. Judgment rates in debt-collection lawsuits in St. Louis County
and City were highest in census tracts with a median income between $20,000 and
$40,000, and the risk of judgment was twice as high in majority-black neighborhoods
as in majority white ones. Id. at 1, 6.
9. Id. at 3, 22. Over 26,000 judgments were against low-income residents, and
over 63,000 against middle-income residents. Id. at 22. The study defined the lowincome range as $22,000–$33,000 and the middle income range as $33,000–$68,000.
Id. The median household income in Missouri, however, is only $47,746 (based on
the Census Bureau’s five year estimates; St. Louis City’s median income is only
$34,800), 42% of the population of St. Louis County falls below the $50,000 family
income level, and the data does not relay where on the scale of $33,000–$68,000 the
bulk of the judgments lay. See id. at 22; QuickFacts for Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/29,2937178 (last visited Nov.
30, 2016) (listing the median household incomes for Missouri and St. Louis city);
American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf
/pages/community_facts.xhtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2016) (listing family income
levels for St. Louis County, Missouri).
10. WALDMAN & KIEL, supra note 8, at 22.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1, 2, 4, 11.
13. Paul Kiel, Why Small Debts Matter So Much to Black Lives, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 31,
2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-small-debts-matter-somuch-to-black-lives (“But there’s no question that the main reason small financial
problems can have such a disproportionate effect on black families is that, for largely
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factors, such as fewer assets in low-income households, fewer resources
available to lean on, and customer bases with large racial disparities.14
These results are largely mirrored in the study’s findings in Illinois and
New Jersey, and reporting shows that many low-income debtors across
the country, regardless of race, have felt the brutal effects of a debt
collection lawsuit.15
The debt collection industry has seen shocking levels of growth in
recent times. Indeed, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
estimates that debt collection has burgeoned into a $13 billion dollar
industry.16 Alongside the debt collection industry is the parallel
growth of consumer debt, which affects close to 35% of American
adults today.17 The number of debtors increased substantially during
the most recent economic downturn,18 and while the average
consumer’s debt is a little over $5000, most consumers are unaware
that a creditor is trying to collect funds from them—or in other
words, that they have a debt in collection.19
This Comment argues that current federal and state laws governing
debt collection lawsuits and the garnishment of wages in Missouri
violate the procedural due process rights—guaranteed by the Fifth

historical reasons rooted in racism, they have far smaller financial reserves to fall
back on than white families.”).
14. See WALDMAN & KIEL, supra note 8, at 18, 20–21.
15. See id. at 1; see also Paul Kiel, For Nebraska’s Poor, Get Sick and Get Sued,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 28, 2014, 4:00 AM) [hereinafter Kiel, Nebraska’s Poor],
https://www.propublica.org/article/for-nebraskas-poor-get-sick-and-get-sued
(recounting the stories of families in Nebraska who have been the victims of debt
collection lawsuits); Paul Kiel, At Capital One, Easy Credit and Abundant Lawsuits,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28, 2015, 5:00 AM) [hereinafter Kiel, Capital One],
https://www.propublica.org/article/at-capital-one-easy-credit-and-abundant-lawsuits
(discussing the volume of debt-collection lawsuits initiated by major banks in New
York, Nevada, Florida, and Virginia); Paul Kiel, In Alabama, a Public Hospital Serves the
Poor—with Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 22, 2014, 12:00 PM) [hereinafter Kiel,
Alabama Public Hospital], https://www.propublica.org/article/in-alabama-a-publichospital-serves-the-poor-with-lawsuits (reviewing the debt-collection suits initiated by
public hospitals in Alabama).
16. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB
ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 1, 7–8 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB ANNUAL REPORT],
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-fair-debt-collection-practicesact.pdf (estimating that the debt-collection industry has roughly 6000 firms with
140,000 employees).
17. Id. at 7 (stating that “77 million of the 220 million Americans with credit
files” have debts that are in collection).
18. ADP REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
19. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (finding that debts in collection
can range from $25 to more than $125,000).
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and Fourteenth Amendments—of low-income communities in the St.
Louis area. Specifically, the collection suits brought against residents
of low-income neighborhoods in St. Louis resulting in judgments
provide neither adequate notice nor ensure an opportunity for
debtors to be heard. Part I explores the social and economic
ramifications of debt collection for families in low-income
communities across Missouri and the explosive growth of the debtbuyer industry, which directly contributes to the growth in debt
collection lawsuits filed. Part I also explains the relevant state and
federal laws that regulate the debt-collection process in Missouri and
provides a brief overview of procedural due process doctrine and its
particular application to pre-judgment garnishment statutes. Part II
demonstrates that debtors’ wages are a constitutionally protected
interest and outlines the deficiencies in notice and the opportunity to
be heard that are commonplace in Missouri debt-collection cases. It
then applies a modified Mathews v. Eldridge20 test to the debt
collection process in Missouri, demonstrating that more judicial
procedures and safeguards are required in Missouri debt collection
lawsuits to protect the constitutional due process rights of debtors in
low-income communities. Part III concludes with suggestions and
remedies to satisfy procedural due process requirements.
I.

DEBT COLLECTION IN MISSOURI

Consumers accumulate debt through a multitude of everyday
services, such as credit cards, auto loans, mortgages, medical debt,
and student loans.21 When consumers fail to pay their debts for these
everyday services, creditors can file debt collection lawsuits in a
process similar to that described above. Various debt collectors
appear in these collection lawsuits, including banks, hospitals, utility
companies, high-cost lenders,22 and, increasingly, debt-buyers—

20. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
21. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7; Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5
(listing sources of debt as credit card bills, medical bills, loans, and, frequently for
the citizens of the St. Louis area, “the sewer bill”).
22. High-cost lenders, such as payday lenders or auto-title lenders, extend credit
to consumers under agreements that can contain exorbitantly high fees or interest
rates. See Paul Kiel, The Payday Playbook: How High Cost Lenders Fight to Stay Legal,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-highcost-lenders-fight-to-stay-legal; Paul Kiel, Let the Game of Whack-A-Mole Begin: Feds Put
Forward New Payday Rules, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 27, 2015, 12:07 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/let-the-game-of-whack-a-mole-begin-feds-putforward-new-payday-rules.
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companies that purchase debt accounts at steep discounts and then
try to collect the debts.23
When a creditor prevails in a debt-collection suit, that party, the
judgment-creditor, may collect the amount of the judgment from the
person who owes the debt, the judgment-debtor. To do so, judgmentcreditors often seek garnishments.24 A garnishment is a legal order
that a judgment-creditor can use to collect the outstanding funds from
the judgment-debtor through a third-party garnishee, such as an
employer or a bank.25 In debt collection actions, a judgment-creditor
typically serves the legal garnishment order on the judgment-debtor’s
employer.26 That garnishment order compels the employer to
periodically withhold a judicially-determined percentage of the
employee’s paycheck and send that money to the judgment-creditor
each pay period until the debt is satisfied.27
A study by ADP, a major supplier of payroll services in the United
States, revealed that in 2013, judgment-creditors garnished wages
from 7.2% of employees.28 The study also demonstrated that the
percentage of employees who had wages garnished was greater in
low-income job industries than in higher-income job industries.29
Notably, the Midwest region of the United States, where Missouri is
located, saw the highest garnishment rates of the study.30 The
23. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5; see also Kiel, Capital One, supra note 15.
24. WALDMAN & KIEL, supra note 8, at 2.
25. 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 552 (2016) (stating
that a third-party garnishee holds the property of the debtor, and that the property
can be reached by a judgment-creditor through a garnishment order); ADP REPORT,
supra note 5, at 4.
26. Id.; Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4.
27. Paul Kiel, When Lenders Sue, Quick Cash Can Turn into a Lifetime of Debt,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 13, 2013, 10:46 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/whenlenders-sue-quick-cash-can-turn-into-a-lifetime-of-debt (relaying the story of one
judgment-debtor whose entire judgment was satisfied through garnishments over a
five-year period).
28. ADP REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. “There are limited national statistics about
wage garnishment.” Id. at 4. “Garnishments are predominantly regulated by diverse
and complex state laws.” Id.
29. Id. at 9. As reported by ADP, the three industries with the highest percentage
of employees experiencing wage garnishment were (1) transportation and utilities
(11.2%), (2) manufacturing (10.2%), and (3) construction (9.1%). Id. The three
industries with the lowest percentage of employees experiencing wage garnishment
were (1) education and health services (5.7%), (2) information services (5.5%), and
(3) professional and business services (5.4%). Id. ADP believes that the imbalance
in garnishment frequency in these particular industries indicates a “possible
relationship between garnishment and blue- and white-collar job categories.” Id.
30. Id. at 11.
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combination of predatory debt collection, garnishment practices, and
an inability to repay debts has led to a cycle of poverty in Missouri
that, for many, is unending, unalterable, and unforgiving.31
A. The Missouri Debt Collection Crisis
When a family’s single largest expense every month is a
garnishment, life in the suburbs of St. Louis often forces that family
to make a difficult trade-off between which bills to pay and which bills
to neglect.32 Priorities swing unpredictably from securing a stable
living situation, to keeping the utilities running, to accessing
transportation.33 One desperate financial situation can easily lead a
debtor into even more perilous debt, and both racial disparity in
debt-collection cases and the judicial process in Missouri contribute
to such a situation.34
1.

Racial disparity in debt-collection lawsuits in St. Louis
Debt-collection lawsuits that result in judgments and garnishments
disproportionately affect lower income communities in the St. Louis
region, and the repercussions are even more pronounced in majorityblack low-income neighborhoods.35 Between 2008 and 2012, debt
collectors seized an estimated $34 million from residents in mostly
black neighborhoods in the St. Louis area.36 Judgments in such suits
are demonstrably concentrated in areas of St. Louis that are majority
black, revealing an aspect of racial disparity in the debt-collection
process in lower income St. Louis communities.37 The debt-

31. See id. (“You go to bed thinking about, ‘How am I going to pay these bills?
How am I going to do this?’ You wake up thinking about it. You go to work thinking
about it.”).
32. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (illustrating a couple’s difficult choice to pay
an electricity bill rather than allocate the funds for their daughter’s dental needs);
Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“When you rank those bills, you’re definitely going to
put those things that are essential to health and safety—that you can’t function
without on a day-to-day basis—first.”).
33. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (explaining that low-income debtors often view
a utility company not shutting off power after a missed payment as a “safety net”).
34. See id. (providing an example of a resident who took out a high-interest loan
to save herself from foreclosure).
35. See id. (“[T]he rate of judgments was twice as high in mostly black
neighborhoods as it was in mostly white ones.”).
36. Id. In that same time period, debt collectors filed one lawsuit for every four
residents in the nearby suburb of Jennings, Missouri, which is 90% black. Id.
37. Id. (citing April Kuehnhoff, an attorney at the National Consumer Law
Center, that the ProPublica analysis raised “crucial questions about how racial
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collection practices of the local water utility, Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer District (“MSD”), provide an example of this disproportionate
effect. MSD files a particularly high number of debt-collection suits
in Missouri courts.38 Judgments obtained in favor of the utility
company affect debtors in black neighborhoods at a rate four times
higher than in white neighborhoods.39
Although racial bias in the debt-collection industry is not
substantially evidenced by data or testimony,40 the “pernicious” gap
in wealth between white and black communities is. Wealth inequality
has “vastly” expanded along racial lines the past thirty years: the
median net worth of black households is $11,000, whereas the
median net worth of white households is $141,000—more than ten
times greater.41 Additionally, federal survey data demonstrate that
black households have lower incomes and fewer assets on average.42
Therefore, even if a black household falls within the $40,000–$60,000
disparities are entering the debt-collection system and what we can do to eliminate
these disparities”).
38. Id. (“In 2010, [Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (“MSD”)] decided too
many customers weren’t paying their bills, so it dramatically increased its collection
efforts.”); see also infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (describing the head-ofhousehold exemption program MSD has for low-income customers, but noting the
low application rates).
39. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
40. MSD claims to have no demographic data on customers and attributes the
racial disparities present in judgments on collection suits to the “broader ills [of] our
community.” Id. DBA International, a debt buyers’ trade group, states that debt
buyers are not aware of the race of debtors when purchasing accounts, and debt
buyer behavior does not create the “racial gap” in the patterns developed by the
collection suits—an executive for the group stated, “Truly, nobody is treated
differently in the process.” Id.
41. Id.; Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial,
Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-greatrecession (restating a study’s conclusion that the wealth gap, despite the recent
economic recovery, has widened along racial lines, and that the wealth gap is at its
highest point since 1989, when white families had seventeen times the wealth of
black families).
42. Id. (citing to the Federal Reserve’s 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances and
applying the data to ProPublica’s analysis). “[T]he typical white family with annual
income between $20,000 and $40,000 had about $2,010 in liquid assets, while the
typical black family in that [income] range had just $650.” Id. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey found that for individuals earning between
$20,000 and $30,000 annually, basic expenditures on housing, transportation, food,
and health care total approximately $22,000 per year. Consumer Expenditure Survey,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cex (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
The average annual income after taxes for the same demographic in the $20,000–
$30,000 income bracket is also reported to be about $26,000. Id.
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household income bracket, that household’s median net worth is
likely to be four times lower than, and available liquid assets almost
twice as low as, a white household’s.43 Black households also tend to
have more limited access to social networks or legal resources that
can provide assistance in a time of financial need.44
Such
discrepancies demonstrate that a black household often has fewer
resources than a white household to resolve even small debts.45 A
“disparity [running] as deep as the nation’s history”46 is not a
problem that lends itself to an easy fix.
Racial tensions in St. Louis compound the crippling amounts of
debt and economic turmoil that the area’s black community faces.47
In the summer of 2014, the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson, Missouri
faced protests and unrest after a white police officer shot and killed
Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, an act for which a grand

43. Kochhar & Fry, supra note 41.
44. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“Low-income families generally do ‘very,
very well given the very meager resources and high expenses they have,’ said Michael
Collins, faculty director of the Center for Financial Security at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. ‘But there comes a point in time when there’s just nothing
there. There’s no more income, there’s no more savings, and the options are pretty
limited, because you don’t have the social network, you don’t have the legal and
other resources available to you to find a solution.’”).
45. Id. (“[G]enerations of discrimination have left black families with grossly
fewer resources to draw on when they come under financial pressure.”).
46. Id. (quoting William A. Darity Jr., a professor of economics and public policy
at Duke University). The wealth gap between white and black households can be
traced back to the institution of slavery, but in more recent history it can also be
linked to damaging policies that promoted white homeownership and restricted
mortgage access to black households, such as redlining. Id.; cf. Laura Bliss, After
Nearly a Century, Redlining Still Divides Baltimore, CITYLAB (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2015/04/after-nearly-a-century-redlining-stilldivides-baltimore/391982 (showing a map connecting current poverty rates in
Baltimore with zones redlined for “undesirable racial concentrations” in the 1930s);
Brentin Mock, Redlining Is Alive and Well—And Evolving, CITYLAB (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/09/redlining-is-alive-and-welland-evolving/
407497 (outlining nine recent cases demonstrating that redlining practices are still
prevalent and have expanded past the realm of housing and mortgages); San
Francisco Tells Pizza Shops to Hold the Excuses, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/14/us/san-francisco-tells-pizza-shops-to-hold-theexcuses.html (reporting on a San Francisco ordinance making it illegal for
businesses to redline normal service areas for “no deliveries” when Domino’s Pizza
flagged areas based on prior threatening or violent incidents or reputation).
47. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“In Jennings, the struggles with debt
compound other hardships common to black communities in St. Louis and
elsewhere: conflicts and tension with police, and a municipal court system that has
jailed residents over unpaid traffic tickets.”).
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jury failed to indict the officer.48 In March of 2015, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a report on Ferguson law
enforcement, uncovering constitutional violations, corruption, and
the use of excessive force, and recommending an overhaul of the
Ferguson criminal justice system.49
Partly in response to the public outcry after the death of Michael
Brown, in November of 2014, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon
established the Ferguson Commission (“the Commission”).50 The
Commission was formed to conduct a “thorough, wide-ranging and
unflinching study of the social and economic conditions that impede
progress, equality and safety in the St. Louis region.”51 According to
the Commission, the lack of economic mobility in St. Louis is one
underlying cause of the tensions in the area.52 The Commission
focused on the “two sides” of the economic mobility issue by
suggesting that improvements in access to education and job training
in the community have the ability to “push people up the ladder,”
whereas the negative effects of debt collection “drag them down.”53
The Commission’s focus on economic mobility underscores the
more serious problems facing the communities of the St. Louis area.

48. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-tow
n-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html.
49. See id. (citing the Ferguson report’s statement that the Ferguson criminal
justice system engaged in “many constitutional violations”); Carol D. Leonnig et al.,
Darren Wilson’s First Job Was on a Troubled Police Force Disbanded by Authorities, WASH.
POST (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/darren-wilsonsfirst-job-was-on-a-troubled-police-force-disbanded-by-authorities/2014/08/23/1ac796
f0-2a45-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INVESTIGATION
OF
THE
FERGUSON
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
15
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (detailing law enforcement practices
that “violate the law and undermine community trust, especially among African
Americans”).
50. THE FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH TOWARD
RACIAL EQUITY 12 (2015), http://forwardthroughferguson.org/.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 48 (stating that economic mobility in St. Louis ranks forty-second
out of the fifty largest metro areas in the country); see also Kiel, infra note 138 (“‘I
really needed cash, and that was the only thing that I could think of doing at the
time,’ she said. The decision has hung over her life ever since.”).
53. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5; see also FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 52
(stating that the Ferguson area’s calls to action should “build a love of learning” and
provide funding for “job training programs that show impact”); id. at 134 (acknowledging
that in Missouri, “nearly 50% of payday loan borrowers eventually defaulted on a loan,
even after they had paid over 90% of the loan amount in fees alone”).
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When a family is forced from home to home, fueled by the desire for
a stable environment free from burglaries and shootings,54 the
burden of debt becomes an even greater one to bear. Bearing a
sizeable portion of the blame are Missouri’s “lax” debt-collection
regulations, which have created an environment in which high-cost
lenders can “thrive.”55 These lenders’ loans are convenient and
sometimes the only available solution for low-income families that do
not have access to traditional avenues for credit.56 Not only do
predatory lenders charge exorbitant interest rates, but they file over
9000 debt-collection lawsuits each year.57 The Ferguson Commission
noted that far more black families have predatory loans than white
families, even though black families constitute a smaller percentage
of all high-interest loan borrowers.58
The Commission also
acknowledged the overwhelming and deep-seated obstacles families
in St. Louis face in attempting to break free from the perilous cycle of
debt that grips them. As one resident noted, “Coming from East St.
Louis from a poor family, I started off in debt.”59
2. How a loan becomes a garnishment in Missouri: A transformation with
few obstacles
In Missouri courtrooms, debt-collection lawsuits “fly” through the
judicial process in droves, sometimes with as many as several hundred
54. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (interviewing one woman who has moved
her family four times in three years—once due to increased shootings and robberies
in the area—and another woman whose family moved when her landlord refused to
fix a plumbing problem that was causing raw sewage to leak into her home); Crime
Rate in St. Louis, Missouri (MO), CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/crime/
crime-St.-Louis-Missouri.html (providing statistics on various violent crime rates).
55. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 49 (recommending that lawmakers
further protect low-income borrowers from predatory lenders by capping APR rates
and reevaluating loan repayment terms and underwriting standards).
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 49 (citing the University of Missouri’s research finding that on average,
payday loans in Missouri have an annual percentage rate (APR) of 444.61%, which
gives Missouri the highest APR rate when compared to the eight contiguous states);
Kiel, infra note 140 (highlighting the snowball-effect of predatory loans).
58. See FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 58 (reporting that 12% of black
Americans received a payday loan in 2012 as compared to only 4% of white
Americans); THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO
BORROWS,
WHERE
THEY
BORROW,
AND
WHY
(July
19,
2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2012/07/19/whoborrows-where-they-borrow-and-why (indicating that although they are “more than
twice as likely as others to have used a payday loan,” black families “make up less than
a quarter of all payday borrowers”).
59. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
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lawsuits appearing before a judge in just one day.60 Debtors, however,
are rarely present at these proceedings; some debtors do not even
know they have a debt in collection until a garnishment appears in
their paycheck.61 On the few occasions that they do appear in court,
they almost always appear without counsel.62 Data from 2008 to 2012
show that in most debt-collection suits resulting in a judgment, the
debt collector attempts to garnish the debtor’s wages regardless of
whether the debtor was present at the hearing.63 Many debtors who
want to hire a lawyer to help with the complicated debt-collection
process cannot afford one.64 Creditors or debt collectors who appear
in debt-collection actions in Missouri may be banks or hospitals and,
more often than not, they are debt-buyers.65 Though federal debtcollection laws seek to minimize the burden on low-income debtors,
they often fall short. For instance, the laws place the “onus” on the
debtor to navigate the complexities of the judicial system.66 In short,
a debtor must know the laws exist and how to properly make a claim
before he can enjoy the protections of these laws.67 Because few
debtors have access to legal counsel, however, they rarely have the
information necessary to protect themselves.
While Missouri law does offer some protections from garnishment
for the head of a household, these protections alone are ineffective
absent legal knowledge or counsel. The notice of garnishment may
inform a debtor that he can apply for the exemption by requesting a
hearing,68 but the notice does not always explain to the debtor that
60. Id.
61. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RUBBER STAMP JUSTICE: US COURTS, DEBT BUYING
CORPORATIONS, AND THE POOR 36 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re
port_pdf/us0116_web.pdf (finding that debtors are unaware of judgments against
them until a garnishment commences, and discussing concerns over “sewer service,”
where process servers falsify information that a debtor has been served with notice);
Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (discussing a debt-collection suit against Rosalyn
Turner where the court file reported that she was personally served with a summons,
but she had no recollection of the event).
62. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (relaying that between 2008 and 2012, debtors
in St. Louis had counsel roughly 8% of the time, and in “lower-income black
neighborhoods,” only 4% had an attorney).
63. Id.
64. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (sympathizing with a couple who found they
could not afford an attorney due to medical bills).
65. Id.; see also Editorial Board, supra note 1. See generally infra Section I.B
(discussing the debt buying industry).
66. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4.
67. Id. (identifying some legal aid offices that receive weekly applications for
assistance in debt-collection claims from debtors who “can’t make ends meet”).
68. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
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qualifying for the exemption can significantly reduce the amount
Debt collectors often pursue judgments
garnished weekly.69
operating under the de facto assumption that the debtor has no
dependents and is therefore subject to the full 25% rate of
garnishment permitted under law.70 Therefore, unless a debtor is
both aware of the head-of-household exemption and actually files for
that reduced rate, the debt collector can seize more from each
paycheck than the collector is actually entitled to.
B. Debt Buying: The Biggest Industry You Have Never Heard of
The debt-collection industry has experienced phenomenal growth
over the past decade due in large part to the advent of debt buyers.71
A debt buyer is an entity that purchases accounts of defaulted debts
from original creditors, such as banks or credit card companies, and
then pursues the collection of the debt, often relentlessly.72 Debt
buyers typically repackage the defaulted debts into portfolios and
resell them to other debt-buying companies.73 This bundling
introduces additional complications into the collection of debt: as
the debt moves further from the original creditor, the information

69. Id.
70. See infra note 138.
71. See CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (“The two biggest debt buyers
are publicly traded companies; combined, they grossed more than $1.9 billion in
annual revenues in 2014.”); FTC, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
CHANGE, A WORKSHOP REPORT 13 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debt
collection/dcwr.pdf (“The most significant change in the debt collection business in
recent years has been the advent and growth of debt buying.”); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 61, at 10.
72. See CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7–8 (reporting that debt buyers
account for close to a third of the debt-collection industry’s revenue with earnings
over $4 billion dollars); see also FTC, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT
BUYING INDUSTRY 12 (2013) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-and-practicesdebt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf (recounting that in the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, the federal agency responsible for liquidating failed
thrifts auctioned off $500 billion in unpaid loans owned by creditors, and seeing the
success of the government sales at producing revenue, other creditors began
engaging in the practice of selling debt).
73. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 17; see also Dalié Jiménez, Dirty
Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 53 (2015) (“Subsequent debt buyers of
an account have no relationship to the original creditor.”).

CONSTANTINEAU.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

494

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/15/2016 3:29 PM

[Vol. 66:479

that is being used to enforce the debt collection, such as debtor
names and addresses, becomes less verifiable.74
The methods debt buyers use to collect debts range from lawful
practices to outright fraud and deceit.75 The debt-buying business
model is a basic one: purchase a debt (or, more likely, large
portfolios of bundled debts)76 at the lowest price possible, employ
economically efficient collection practices, and recoup a sizeable
profit.77 Debt buyers often purchase voluminous portfolios of debt in
a single transaction, and the documentation regarding the accounts
contained in the debt purchase is generally sparse.78 Another
common practice is for the sellers to disclaim all liability and warranty
regarding the debts sold.79 Some sellers even include contractual
provisions that explicitly decline to warrant that the information
about the debts is accurate.80 Debt buyers, however, are able to

74. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (“The sale and resale of debts has
raised concerns about debt data integrity and information flows from creditor to
debt buyer to subsequent debt buyers.”).
75. See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 34–35 (describing FTC
actions in 2014 against debt collectors that engaged in fraudulent conduct).
76. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 29 (“[D]ebt buyers typically
receive from debt sellers at the time of sale only an electronic spreadsheet containing
minimal information about debts and debtors.”).
77. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 11 (observing that debt buyers
can “realize substantial profits by collecting even a small percentage of the debts they
purchase”); Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed
by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 191–93 (2014) [hereinafter Holland,
Junk Justice] (discussing the “seemingly easy money to be made” from the “purchase,
sale, and suing upon old, unreliable, inaccurate” records of outstanding debts).
78. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at iii (reporting that debt buyers
obtain “very few documents” related to their purchases, and most buyers receive no
documentation at the time of the sale); Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77, at 193
(explaining how creditors sell debts “as is,” and that the industry is plagued by
“inaccurate documentation of . . . consumer . . . accounts”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 61, at 40 (asserting that debt purchases contain minimal amounts of
identifying information, “such as names, social security numbers, amounts allegedly
owed, and last known addresses”).
79. See Jiménez, supra note 73, at 59–60 (discussing how debts are sold “as is” and
“with all faults,” and sellers make “no affirmative representations” that they even have
title to the debts or whether the debts are “unencumbered”); STRUCTURE AND
PRACTICES, supra note 72, at iii (reporting on the absence of any guarantee regarding
the accuracy of the information provided about debts during a sale).
80. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 2; see also STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES,
supra note 72, at iii–iv (explaining that debt buyers have limited access to account
documents, original creditors often have no obligation to provide any
documentation to subsequent buyers, and sellers typically disclaim the availability of
documents pertaining to debts sold).
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purchase these debts at extremely low prices, significantly reducing
any financial risk in the investment.81
Representatives of the debt-buying industry claim to prefer
resolving debts with consumers outside the courtroom.82 Federal
consumer protections restrict debt buyers that adhere to this policy of
“voluntary” resolution from using deceptive or abusive collection
methods.83 However, debt buyers’ courtroom practices controvert their
claimed interest in informal resolution because it is well documented
that debt buyers collect debts primarily through litigation.84
Once in the litigation phase, debt buyers engage in many
questionable debt-collection practices. Debt buyers’ claims can fall
far short of federal information requirements when portfolio
purchases provide scant information regarding the ownership and
history of a debt.85 Yet, debt buyers are prevailing in filing lawsuits
81. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 23–24 (finding in a study that
debt buyers were paying an average of 4 cents for each dollar of debt, though some
purchases were for as little as 2.2 cents per dollar); Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5
(“The companies buy debts for pennies on the dollar and then try to recover what
they can from debtors.”).
82. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 16 (quoting DBA International, a
leading industry trade association of U.S. debt buyers, on its preference to resolve
debts with consumers under “voluntar[y]”conditions). Encore Capital, one of the
dominant debt buying firms in the market, asserts that it turns to litigation against
debtors as a “last resort.” Id. at 13, 16 (stating that some debt buyers engage in
alternative collection practices, such as phone calls, mailings, or through third-party
collection agencies); see also Terry Carter, Debt-Buying Industry and Lax Court Review
Are Burying Defendants in Defaults, ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2015, 4:20 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/debt_buying_industry_and_lax_court
_review_are_burying_defendants_in_default (“The last thing a debt buyer wants to
do is file suit and seek judgment . . . . They want to work out a payment plan. It’s
expensive to sue. We sue the ‘won’t pays,’ not the ‘can’t pays.’” (quoting Jan Stieger,
Executive Director of DBA International)).
83. See infra Section I.C.1 (reviewing the protections of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”)).
84. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 13 (alleging that hundreds of
thousands of new debt-collection claims are filed across the country by debt buyers
each year); Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77, at 183 (“Lawsuits filed by junk debt
buyers expose a business model that is, literally, the buying and selling of claims to
be utilized in litigation for profit.”); Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (charging that
debt buyers “now routinely use the courts to pursue millions of people over even
small consumer debts” and “filed the most suits of any type of plaintiffs between 2008
and 2012”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 16 (reporting that in
2014, two large-scale debt buyers together earned nearly $1 billion through debt
collection lawsuits alone, which amounted to roughly half of their total respective
collections for the year).
85. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of
information that is passed on with a debt during a sale).
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that should fail for a whole host of reasons, one example being
affidavits with inaccurate and unverified information about who owns
a debt or how much the consumer actually owes.86
Most courts require debt-buyers seeking to collect a debt to submit
an affidavit “attesting that they have personal knowledge of the debt
at issue and believe that the allegations presented in the lawsuit are
true and accurate.”87 The common industry practice of “robosigning,” however, aggravates the risk that these debt buyers are
including incorrect or deficient information in these affidavits.88
“Robo-signing,” which is “the practice of signing affidavits and other
documents so quickly” that the information in the document “could
not possibly” be verified by the signer, has led to much of the faulty
information provided in lawsuits.89
Including unverified and
potentially inaccurate information means that such lawsuits may
actually target the wrong person or the wrong debt, further
exacerbating problems with the debt-collection process.
Debt buyers filing claims seeking to recover uncollectable debts
should also fail at the filing stage. A debt is uncollectable when, for
instance, the debt has already been paid in full or is already in
collection elsewhere.90
Failures to satisfy documentation
requirements when filing a claim can lead debt buyers to sue a
consumer twice on a debt that has already been recovered, paid, or
settled elsewhere, causing “duplicative judgments.”91 Such judgments
mean that debtors may find themselves paying one debt collector
only to be sued on the same debt by a separate debt collector.92 Or, a
debtor may be trying to repay the original creditor without knowing
that the debt has been sold.93
86. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 45; infra notes 114–15 and
accompanying text (reviewing the verification requirements under the FDCPA).
87. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 45 & n.119 (acknowledging the
affidavit as necessary to ensure compliance with the “‘business records exemption’ to
the general bar on hearsay evidence”).
88. Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court:
Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 268–69
(2011) [hereinafter Holland, Robo-Signing].
89. Id. Employees at debt-collection firms report signing hundreds of affidavits a
day, with one woman even reporting that she signed an affidavit about every thirteen
seconds. David Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer’s Cramp, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
31, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/business/01debt.html.
90. Holland, Robo-Signing, supra note 88, at 270–71.
91. Id. (chastising this confusing practice, noting that it can even lead to firms
filing suit against each other to obtain the right to collect on a debt).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Time-barred claims, or “zombie debts,” are also improperly filed if
they are brought after the statute of limitations has run.94 While
knowingly filing or threatening to file a time-barred claim for debt is
an unfair practice in violation of federal law,95 courts have held that
simply attempting to collect on a “potentially time-barred debt that is
otherwise valid” is not a violation.96 Furthermore, while federal law
limits the types of actions debt buyers can take over time-barred debt,
consumers must assert the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense in most states.97 Because debtors often lack awareness of the
legal process and lack representation, this requirement results in a
much larger window of time in which a debt buyer can legally
attempt to collect on a debt.
Concern regarding unethical debt-collection practices has not
slowed the debt-buyer industry down.98 In 2013, one of the largest

94. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012); Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt
Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 327–28 (2014) (“Just as the zombies in movies come
back from the dead to terrorize individuals, dead debts may resurface to wreak havoc
on consumers.”).
95. See, e.g., Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.
2001).
96. See id.; see also Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 35 (3d Cir. 2011)
(permitting debt collectors to seek repayment of time-barred debt, as long as there is
no threat of legal action); Larsen v. JBC Legal Grp., PC, 533 F. Supp. 2d 290, 303
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Although it is permissible for a debt collector to seek to collect on a
time-barred debt voluntarily, it is prohibited from threatening litigation with respect to
such a debt.”); Kimber v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala.
1987) (limiting debt collectors from filing lawsuits that appear to be time-barred when
filed, rather than suits that were later determined to be time-barred). But see McMahon
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014) (splitting from the Third
and Eighth Circuits by holding that threatened litigation is not required for a
misrepresentation claim under the FDCPA); Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing,
Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 511, 513 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a settlement offer letter for a
time-barred debt did violate the FDCPA, despite no mention of litigation in the letter).
See generally Sobol, supra note 94, at 328, 330–31, 345, 369 (addressing the growth of
litigation over “zombie”—or time-barred—debts, the failure of federal law to prevent
courts from reaching the judgment stage in suits filed to collect time-barred debts,
and how states can correct the problem).
97. See STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 45; see also APRIL KUEHNHOFF &
MARGOT SAUNDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., ZOMBIE DEBT: WHAT THE CFPB SHOULD
DO
ABOUT
ATTEMPTS
TO
COLLECT
OLD
DEBT
2
(2015),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_collection/report-zombie-debt-2015.pdf (“Debt
collectors frequently exploit [consumer] ignorance [of time-barred debt] by pursuing
collection of old debts long after the relevant statute of limitations has run.”).
98. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 11 (reporting that in 2013 and
2014 an industry-leading debt buyer purchased accounts totaling almost $100
billon); STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at ii (finding that over three years,
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debt-buying companies in the country reportedly collected over $1
billion in outstanding debts.99 The movement in the debt buyer
industry of a debt from creditor to debt buyer to subsequent debt
buyer thus creates “untraceable cycles” of debt resales that do not
adequately retain consumers’ personal information or protect it from
being used erroneously by the debt buyer in collection attempts.100
C. Federal and State Law Regulating Debt-Collection Practices in Missouri
In Missouri, a combined regime of state and federal laws regulates
debt-collection practices, from initiating a claim through the
collection of a court judgment. The applicable federal laws are
specific to debt collection and wage garnishment, while the relevant
Missouri state laws are general to all civil actions, including the
enforcement of judgments.101
1.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”)102 in 1977 in response to the “abusive, deceptive, and
unfair” practices debt collectors increasingly employed against
consumers.103 The language of the FDCPA makes clear that Congress
was trying to protect the rights of ethical creditors to collect on valid
debts while also limiting the ability of unscrupulous third-party debt
collectors to manipulate or mistreat consumers.104 The FDCPA
defines “creditor” as any person who extends credit that creates a
debt.105 However, the statute explicitly excludes from the definition
debt buyers purchased over 5000 portfolios containing almost 90 million consumer
accounts with a cumulative value of $143 billion).
99. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4.
100. CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8–9 (contending that with the lax
hold over personally identifying information attached to the ownership of the debt,
it becomes far more difficult for debt buyers to ensure that they have “unique
ownership” over the debts they are trying to collect).
101. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1692 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–.1610 (2016).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
103. Id. The FDCPA defines “consumer” as a “natural person obligated or
allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” Id. § 1692a(3).
104. Id. § 1692(b) (“Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are
inadequate to protect consumers.”); id. §§ 1692b, 1692d (addressing and limiting the
ability of debt collectors to contact consumers); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 802, 91 Stat. 874, 874 (1977) (declaring that “[a]busive debt
practices contribute” to the development of social ills such as “bankruptcies, . . .
marital instability, [and] the loss of jobs,” and ensuring the protection of “debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices”).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).
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of creditor a person who receives “an assignment or transfer of a debt
in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt
for another.”106 A “debt collector” is defined in the FDCPA as any
person whose “principal purpose . . . is the collection of any debts, or
who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”107 Based
on the plain language of these definitions and the case law
interpreting their scope, courts interpret the term “debt collector” as
encompassing debt-collection agencies, debt-buying entities, and
debt-collection law firms.108
The FDCPA protects consumers from a variety of unfair and
unconscionable collection practices,109 including harassment or
abuse, the use or threat of violence, the use of obscene language, or
public reputational harm.110 A debt collector is also prohibited from
engaging in false or misleading representations related to the
collection of a consumer’s debt.111 Specifically, debt collectors

106. Id.
107. Id. § 1692a(6).
108. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, What Constitutes “Debt Collector” for
Purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6)), 173 A.L.R. Fed. 223
§ 2a (2001). Debt buyers and debt-collection law firms who purchase debt have tried
to argue that they do not fall under the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector.” Id.
Courts have routinely ruled against this line of reasoning. Id.; see, e.g., McKinney v.
Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a purchaser of
a defaulted debt still falls under the definition of debt collector in the FDCPA); FTC
v. Check Inv’rs, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that a company
was a debt collector because an entity cannot be both a “creditor” and “debt
collector” under the FDCPA, and the debts were obtained after they were already in
default); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that
Congress removed the statutory exception for attorneys collecting debt on behalf of
clients, and finding that an attorney engaging in that practice was a debt collector
under the FDCPA); see also Conor P. Duffy, Note, A Sum Uncertain: Preserving Due
Process and Preventing Default Judgments in Consumer Debt Buyer Lawsuits in New York, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1147, 1168 nn.139–40 (2013) (reviewing cases that interpreted
“debt collector” broadly).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (forbidding debt collectors from issuing arbitrary fees or
charges; cashing or threatening to cash checks in a delayed or premature fashion,
demanding payment by threat of criminal prosecution or baseless threats of judicial
action, communicating about the debt via postcard, or attempting to disguise a
mailed notice as something else).
110. See id. § 1692d.
111. Id. § 1692e.
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cannot misrepresent the legal status of a debt, the threat of legal
action, or the information regarding applicable legal remedies.112
The FDCPA requires debt collectors to follow certain procedural
obligations as well. In a debt collector’s initial communication with
the consumer, whether written or oral, the debt collector must
disclose that it is attempting to collect a debt, and that any
information gained from the interaction with the consumer may be
used in further attempts to secure repayment.113 The burden of
validating the information connected to a debt in collection also falls
on the debt collector.114 A debt collector must send a validation
notice to the consumer within five days of the initial contact and
provide baseline information regarding the debt.115
There are few affirmative actions available to consumers to combat
abuses by debt collectors. A consumer can dispute a debt within
thirty days of receiving the validation notice.116 Upon notice of the
dispute, the debt collector must cease all efforts to collect the debt
until further information verifying the amount and owner of the debt
has been provided to the debtor.117 Furthermore, a consumer can
halt all communication with a debt collector if the consumer notifies
the collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay the debt or

112. Id. (stating that debt collectors cannot falsely lead a debtor to believe that
they may be subject to a garnishment, the loss of a defense, a seizure, or any other
legal ramifications).
113. Id. § 1692e(11).
114. Id. § 1692g(a). The validation notice must include the following information:
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of
the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt
will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed,
the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment
against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirtyday period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and
address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.
Id.
115. Id. If the debt collector meets the notice requirement during the initial
communication, the debt collector does not need to send a separate validation
notice. Id.
116. Id. § 1692g(b).
117. Id.
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that the consumer wants the collector to cease all communication.118
Of note, the FDCPA precludes debt collectors from using a
consumer’s failure to dispute the validity of a debt as an admission of
liability in a lawsuit.119 The final safeguard in the FDCPA creates an
individual private right of action, imposing potential civil liability on
any debt collector who fails to act in accordance with any of the
requirements of the FDCPA.120
2.

The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968
In 1968, Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(“CCPA”).121 The legislature was aware that predatory lenders would
continue employing harmful practices against consumers absent
protections against the unrestricted garnishment of wages.122
Congress enacted the CCPA to protect the poorest populations—
those making minimum wage or less—from garnishment.123
Nonetheless, as ADP stated in its garnishment study, “the laws have
not necessarily evolved with the times.”124 Applying the CCPA today is
increasingly complicated because the minimum wage calculation has
not been scaled to account for inflation over the past several
decades.125 In 1968, the federal minimum wage was $1.60; adjusted
for inflation, that equals $10.34 in 2012 dollars.126 The current
federal minimum wage is only $7.25, meaning the law will only
protect workers who earn less than $217.50 per week.127 Under the
118. Id. § 1692c(c) (indicating that debt collectors can continue communication
to invoke a specific remedy).
119. Id. § 1692g(c).
120. See id. § 1692k (detailing that a debt collector found liable to the debtor
could be held responsible for actual damages, additional damages as allowed by the
court up to $1000, and attorney’s fees); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166,
1171 n.1 (2013) (recognizing that the private enforcement provision of the FDCPA
authorizes aggrieved debtors to recover from debt collectors who “fail[] to comply”
with the FDCPA).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1671.
122. See id. § 1671(a)(1), (2) (“The unrestricted garnishment of compensation . . .
encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit. Such extensions of credit
divert money into excessive credit payments . . . . The application of garnishment as
a creditors’ remedy frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor . . . .”).
123. Id. § 1673(a).
124. ADP REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
125. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (stating that the current method of
calculation for garnishment is the same standard used in 1968, “when the financial
life of Americans was much simpler”).
126. Minimum Wage Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/mi
nimum-wage/chart1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
127. Id.; Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4.
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CCPA, only workers earning approximately $11,000 or less per year
qualify for the statute’s garnishment protections.128 An income at
that rate places a worker at or below the federal poverty guidelines.129
The CCPA also caps the amount that a worker’s after-tax pay can
be garnished at 25%, which federal survey data indicates is enough of
a deduction in income to place a strain on family finances.130 Local
reporting by ProPublica and NPR shows that debtors are losing
hundreds of dollars each week in garnished wages to debt collectors
that have obtained judgments on outstanding debts.131
The CCPA is silent on a debt collector’s authority to seize funds
from a debtor’s bank account.132 This omission creates a gap in the
federal law regulating the garnishment of funds after a court has
awarded a judgment in a debt-collection lawsuit. Essentially, once a
judgment-debtor who is legally subject to a wage garnishment
deposits a paycheck into a bank account, the statute’s silence allows a
judgment-creditor to seize all of the funds in that bank account—far
more than the 25% the CCPA contemplates.133
The CCPA includes safeguards for heads of households and
consumers who are already subject to a pre-existing court-ordered
128. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4.
129. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 3236, 3236–
37 (Jan. 22, 2015) (stating that for a single-person household, the poverty guideline
is $11,670). The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2015, 43.1 million Americans
lived below the HHS poverty guidelines. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 12 (2016).
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2012) (stating that the maximum garnishment rate is
either 25% of disposable weekly earnings or the amount calculated using the federal
minimum wage, whichever is less); Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (“It makes you feel
hopeless, that you’re working for no reason and that you’re never going to be able to
succeed.”). The Federal Reserve, in a recent survey, found that nearly 20% of
respondents with average salaries of $20,000–$30,000 felt that they could not possibly
cover an emergency expense of $400. Id.
131. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (reporting on a Nebraska household that loses
about $760 each month and how, in repeated instances, the family saw hundreds of
dollars garnished from their bank account at once); Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5
(discussing Yolonda Henderson, who reported seizures of $382 from her credit
union account in one day and $185 from a single paycheck; Miranda Jones, who
described a seizure of $800 from her bank account in one instance; Dora Byrd, who
lost $645 in a single seizure from her bank account; Rosalyn Turner, who lost about
$300 a month to a garnishment; and Cori Winfield, who had almost $250 seized from
her pay every two weeks).
132. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (discussing the CCPA’s silence on bank
account seizures).
133. See id. (commenting on the “punishing” nature of collectors’ actions to empty
a bank account, and noting that few states have regulations that will automatically
protect minimum amounts of funds in a debtor’s bank account).

CONSTANTINEAU.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

FAIR FOR WHOM?

12/15/2016 3:29 PM

503

garnishment.134 However, like the FDCPA, the CCPA leaves debtors
with the burden of asserting one of the exceptions outlined above to
“protect their assets.”135
3.

The regulatory environment for debt collection in Missouri
Missouri currently has very few state statutes or regulations that
specifically address debt-collection practices.136 Accordingly, any
debt-collection action commenced in Missouri is governed primarily
by the general Missouri Revised Statutes and the FDCPA.137 Under
Missouri law, a judgment-creditor may legally garnish 25% of a
debtor’s disposable income.138 The Missouri Revised Statutes state
that the minimum rate of interest to be attached to a judgment is 9%
yearly, but judgment-creditors are also legally allowed to set the postjudgment interest rate on the debt at the rate set forth in the contract
extending the original credit to the judgment-debtor.139 The effect of
high post-judgment interest rates is a form of “exploding debt,”
which a judge in the St. Louis area has likened to “indentured
servitude.”140 Debts that originated in the hundreds of dollars can

134. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b).
135. Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4.
136. The “Debt Collection” page of the Missouri Division of Finance’s website
displays the following language: “Missouri does not regulate collection agencies;
however, these companies do need to comply with the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.” Debt Collection, MO. DIV. OF FIN., http://finance.mo.gov/consumers/
debt_collection.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). The website’s message concludes,
“Further information can be found on the Federal Trade Commission’s Web site at
http://www.ftc.gov.” Id.
137. This statutory framework means that debt collectors in Missouri still must
adhere to the notice, communication, and validation requirements in the FDCPA. See
supra text accompanying notes 109–15 (covering the requirements of the FDCPA).
138. Wage Garnishment, ST. LOUIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., http://www.stlouisco.com
/LawandPublicSafety/CircuitCourt/SheriffsOffice/WageGarnishmentInformation
(last visited Nov. 30, 2016); see also Paul Kiel, Loan Amounts Can Snowball When Payday
Lenders
Sue
Borrowers,
ST.
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH
(Dec.
14,
2013),
http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/loan-amounts-can-snowball-when-paydaylenders-sue-borrowers/article_4032d388-609a-5e5b-8812-9bd67c50fb85.html
(observing that twenty states allow debt collectors to garnish up to 25% of a borrower’s
paycheck, while only four states prohibit wage garnishment for most types of debt).
139. MO. REV. STAT. § 408.040(2) (2015).
140. Kiel, supra note 138 (describing a debtor who paid $3573 towards his $400
debt over the course of seven years but still owed $16,000 due to interest accruing over
that period); see also Ian Liberty, Note, From Debt Collection to Debt Slavery: How the Modern
Practice of Debt Collection Is a Violation of the 13th Amendment’s Prohibition on Involuntary
Servitude, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 281, 308 (2014) (analogizing modern debt
collection with Civil War-era practices of slavery and indentured servitude).
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quickly “balloon” to tens of thousands of dollars.141 One debtor, for
instance, saw a $1000 loan grow to over $40,000 of debt in only a five
year period.142 When faced with a debt of such immense proportions,
a debtor’s options become severely limited: declare bankruptcy or
“make payments for . . . life.”143
The Missouri Revised Statutes do contain a head-of-household
exemption that limits the amount that can be garnished from a
debtor’s wages.144 Under the exemption, a debtor qualifying as the
head of a household can reduce the amount garnished to 10% of his
or her income, protecting 90% of the income that the primary,
oftentimes sole, wage earner of a family earns.145 That 10% cap is the
maximum amount that can be garnished from any individual
paycheck even when multiple judgment-creditors are entitled to
payment.146 The burden of asserting this protection falls on the
judgment-debtor, who must file an affidavit with the court asserting
his or her status as the head of a family.147
Public entities in Missouri have implemented policies that, while
not as authoritative as statutes, afford protections to low-income
debtors.148 The public water utility, MSD,149 has a program for lowincome customers to reduce their payments, similar to the reductions

141. Paul Kiel, What Can Be Done Right Now to Fix the Legal System for Debt Collection,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/what-canbe-done-to-fix-the-debt-collection-right-now.
142. Kiel, supra note 138.
143. Id.
144. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.440 (“Each head of a family may select and hold,
exempt from execution, . . . wages, not exceeding in value the amount of [$1250]
plus [$350] for each of such person’s unmarried dependent children under the age
of twenty-one years or dependent . . . except ten percent of any debt, income, salary
or wages due such head of a family.”); see also Wage Garnishment, supra note 138 (“For
the primary or sole wage earner of a family, 90% of his or her income is protected
from garnishment.”).
145. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.440.
146. Wage Garnishment, supra note 138.
147. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (referring to the burden that falls on debtors
to protect their assets); Affidavit for Head of Family Exemption of Wages Garnishment, MO.
CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=58441 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
ST.
LOUIS
SEWER
DIST.,
148. See,
e.g.,
Billing
FAQs,
METRO.
http://www.stlmsd.com/msd-faqs/billing-faqs (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
149. MSD “dramatically increased” the volume of suits it filed for collecting debts
from 3000 in 2010 to 11,000 in 2012. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5. The suits,
generally for small debts, were mostly filed against consumers in majority black
communities despite the fact that most of MSD’s customers are white. Id.
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provided under the head-of-household exemption.150
Again,
however, the burden of claiming such a reduction lies with the
debtor.151 In 2015, MSD estimated that 39,000 customers were
potentially eligible for the reduction, but as of June 2015, only 2300
were enrolled in the program, meaning only about 5% of customers
had taken advantage of the program.152
In searching for a remedy to unfair debt-collection practices,
consumers in Missouri have attempted to use the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act (“MPA”).153 The applicable provisions
of the MPA protect consumers against fraud, deception, and unfair
practices.154 The MPA provides that “[a]ny person who purchases or
leases merchandise . . . and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss . . . may
bring a private civil action . . . to recover actual damages.”155 Despite
its seemingly broad scope, courts have interpreted the MPA’s use of
the word “merchandise” to limit consumers’ ability to apply the
statute to third-party debt-collection actions. In private actions
brought under the MPA, courts have required a connection between
the unfair or deceptive practice and the original transaction.156 While
150. Billing FAQs, supra note 148. MSD’s Customer Assistance program offers
reduced rates for low-income residents who own or rent the property for which they
are applying for a reduction. Id. The reduction equals 50% of the current charges
for wastewater and storm water services on a customer’s monthly sewer bill. Id.
151. Id. To receive a reduced rate, a customer must apply by completing an
application and submitting it to MSD. Id. Applications are only available after
placing a request via phone to MSD. Id. Reduced rates are only valid for a one-year
period at which time a new application is required to reapply. Id.
152. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (adding that MSD was “not satisfied with [the]
level of enrollment”).
153. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.1610 (2016). The Missouri General Assembly
enacted the law in 1967 to provide a statutory cause of action to protect consumers
and to codify the common law remedies for deceptive practices. Jeremy Gogel,
Remedies (and Lack Thereof) for Victims of Abusive Debt Collection Practices, 66 J. MO. B.
330, 333–34 (2010); see also State ex rel. Danforth v. Indep. Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d
362, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (“In order to give broad scope to the statutory
protection and to prevent ease of evasion because of overly meticulous definitions,
many of these laws such as the Missouri statute ‘do not attempt to define deceptive
practices or fraud, but merely declare unfair or deceptive acts or practices
unlawful . . . ,’ leaving it to the court in each particular instance to declare whether
fair dealing has been violated.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
154. MO. REV. STAT. § 407.020(1).
155. Id. § 407.025(1) (emphasis added).
156. See State ex rel. Koster v. Prof’l Debt Mgmt., LLC, 351 S.W.3d 668, 670–71
(Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing an action for failure to state a claim because the
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MPA”) does not extend to unfair or
deceptive debt-collection practices by a third-party collector who was not a
participant in the original consumer transaction and the actions occurred after the
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the statute contains the language “before, during or after the sale,”
courts have read this language as a mere modification of the
requirement that an unfair practice be connected to a sale or
merchandise, not as an extension to interactions with third parties.157
As a result of this narrow interpretation, the MPA does not reach a
third-party collector, such as a debt buyer or a collection agency,
“who ha[s] no other involvement with the . . . transaction” past
purchasing the defaulted debt from the original creditor.158
D. The Evolution of Procedural Due Process and Garnishment Actions
Debt collection practices in Missouri illustrate the complex process
through which a debt results in a garnishment. Garnishments,
however, raise procedural due process questions because the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect against
the “deprivation of life, liberty or property.”159 Courts have found
that these constitutional amendments provide individuals facing
deprivations with the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard

initial sale of merchandise); Lavender v. Wolpoff & Ambramson, LLP, No. 07-0015CV-W-FJG, 2007 WL 2507752, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing a deceptive
practices claim against a debt-collection law firm under the MPA when debtors could
not establish they were clients or customers of the debt collectors, and the debt
collectors never sold any goods or merchandise or provided any services to debtors).
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently extended the protections of the MPA to the
mortgage-loan context, but both a Missouri appellate court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit have declined to extend that holding to two cases
involving third-party debt collectors. Compare Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 438
S.W.3d 410, 412, 415–17 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (limiting the holding in Koster by
finding that a loan servicer and a mortgagee’s assignee undertook unfair actions
enforcing the terms of a mortgage loan “in connection with” the original loan
transaction under the MPA, even though the servicer and assignee were not parties
to the original loan transaction), with Wivell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887,
892, 895 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that Conway does not apply to a trustee, but a
foreclosure may be “in connection with” a sale under the MPA when the debtors
were informed that modification of a loan would suspend a foreclosure), and Geran
v. Xerox Educ. Servs., Inc., 469 S.W.3d 459, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (declining to
extend Conway to a loan servicer’s actions regarding repayment for a loan because a
schedule modification is not “in connection with” a sale under the MPA).
157. MO. REV. STAT. § 407.020(1) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Koster, 351 S.W.3d at
674 (“We are not persuaded that actions occurring after the initial sales transaction,
which do not relate to any claims or representations made before or at the time of
the initial sales transaction, and which are taken by a person who is not a party to the
initial sales transaction, are made ‘in connection with’ the sale or advertisement of
merchandise as required by the MPA.”).
158. Koster, 351 S.W.3d at 674; Gogel, supra note 153, at 334.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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“appropriate to the nature of the case.”160 Due process protections
ensure the right to be heard—a right that can only be enjoyed when
the person facing a deprivation has received meaningful and
reasonable notice of the opportunity to be heard.161 The United
States Supreme Court developed its jurisprudence in a line of cases
ending in Mathews v. Eldridge, the seminal case that established the
analysis necessary to ensure due process prior to a deprivation of
property.162 Around the same time period, the Court was reviewing
the procedural due process required in cases regarding prejudgment
seizures of property. In the 1990s, when the Court ruled again on the
constitutionality of prejudgment seizures of property in Connecticut v.
Doehr,163 the Court relied on both series of cases to develop a
modified test for due process.
1.

Procedural due process and Supreme Court doctrine
When the government infringes on constitutionally protected
interests, the right to procedural due process assures that a person
has a right to a meaningful prior hearing. In Goldberg v. Kelly,164 the
Court laid out the analysis for determining what process is due when
a constitutionally protected interest is at stake.165 The question in
Goldberg revolved around whether a state had to provide a recipient of
public welfare benefits with a hearing before terminating those
benefits.166 The Court held that due process entitled the recipient to
a pre-termination hearing during which the recipient could appear in

160. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The
Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth
Amendment specifies that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth
Amendment applies to the actions of the federal government, while the Fourteenth
Amendment applies due process protections to state actions.
161. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914)). “The purpose of this requirement . . . is to protect [a person’s] use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations of property . . . .” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–
81 (1972) (holding pre-judgment replevin statutes to be unconstitutional absent a
prior hearing).
162. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (establishing a three-part
balancing test to address procedural requirements when the government potentially
deprives a party of his or her property).
163. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
164. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
165. Id. at 255.
166. Id.

CONSTANTINEAU.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

508

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/15/2016 3:29 PM

[Vol. 66:479

person and offer oral evidence to support his claims.167 Key to the
Goldberg opinion is the assertion that the threat of a “grievous loss” of
a property interest demands special protections and requires courts
to balance unjust deprivation of property with the government’s
interest in resolving the matter.168
A few years later, in Board of Regents v. Roth,169 the Court continued
its examination of how to evaluate due process deprivations.170 In
Roth, a professor without tenure rights alleged that the state university
violated his due process rights when they provided notice, but not a
hearing, regarding his termination.171 The Court created a two-part
analysis where it first determined whether there was a constitutionally
protected interest and then—only upon a positive finding—
determined what process was due to protect that interest.172
In Mathews, the Court reviewed the termination of a person’s social
security disability benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing.173 The
Court held that the extensive administrative procedures in place
ensured that due process requirements were met.174 In its holding,
the Court established a balancing test for the consideration of the
different interests at play. The Mathews test balances three factors:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.175

167. Id. at 266–71.
168. Id. at 262 n.8, 263–64.
169. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
170. Id. at 569–72.
171. Id. at 566–69.
172. Id. at 570–72; see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is
determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.”); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972) (deciding the case alongside Roth); Cafeteria &
Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (holding that in
determining what procedures are required under a particular set of circumstances, a
court must identify the governmental function and private interests involved).
173. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
174. Id. at 349.
175. Id. at 334–35.
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Both the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have used the Mathews
test in myriad applications since it was established,176 eventually
applying it to find pre-judgment garnishments unconstitutional.177
2.

The unconstitutionality of pre-judgment garnishment statutes
The Supreme Court, in a string of cases from the late 1960s to the
early 1970s, established the minimum procedural due process
protections required before a debt collector can secure payment
from debtors through a private lawsuit.178 The cases work in a slightly
disjunctive fashion to create a framework for the process that is due
when property is seized prior to a judgment.179 Notably, the Supreme
Court decided these cases during the “peak of the welfare rights
movement,” when the Court stressed the importance of fair legal
standards for indigent populations, and this reasoning continued
through the Sniadach tetrad.180 The Court’s procedural due process
analyses in Goldberg, Roth, and ultimately in Mathews, parallels the

176. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444–45 (2011) (determining
whether counsel is required in a civil contempt proceeding); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (establishing the process required for a United States citizen
held as an enemy combatant); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 431–32 (1979)
(requiring a higher standard of proof in a commitment case for mental illness to
meet due process demands).
177. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (using a modified version of
the Mathews test to conduct a due process analysis).
178. N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 619–20 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340–42 (1969).
179. Linda Beale, Note, Connecticut v. Doehr and Procedural Due Process Values:
The Sniadach Tetrad Revisited, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1603, 1603 (1994) (“When the
Supreme Court addressed the prejudgment remedy case of Connecticut v. Doehr . . . , it
grappled with the Sniadach tetrad, a line of precedent that meandered across the due
process constitutional law landscape leaving a trail of invalidated state statutes and
confused lower courts.” (footnotes omitted)).
180. Id. at 1641; see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (deciding
that a statute requiring payment of fees for divorce proceedings violated due process
of indigents); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971) (ruling that a state statute
converting court fines to incarceration violated the constitutional rights of
indigents); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (protecting government
benefit recipients from termination of benefits absent an in-person hearing);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (invalidating three state statutes that
required a one-year waiting period for new residents applying for welfare benefits);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (relying on the Equal
Protection Clause to overturn a poll tax voting requirement as discriminatory against
indigents); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that fair
procedure requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent challenging the
certification that an appeal is taken in good faith).
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procedural due process analysis in the cases involving private debt
collection lawsuits: the Sniadach tetrad181 and Connecticut v. Doehr.
a.

The Sniadach Tetrad

The Court first discussed the constitutionality of a pre-judgment
garnishment in the context of private suits in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.182 In Sniadach, a creditor in Wisconsin brought a
garnishment action against a debtor and her employer as garnishee,
and the debtor moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
proceedings violated her due process rights.183 Under the Wisconsin
statute governing garnishment procedure, a complainant could begin
the process for an in rem seizure of the debtor’s wages solely by
requesting the court clerk to issue a summons and serving the
summons and the complaint upon the debtor.184 The debtor’s wages
would then remain frozen until the matter was resolved.185 The Court
found a procedural due process violation in the garnishment
action.186 Although the creditor had provided the debtor with
statutorily adequate notice through service of summons, the Court
found that the creditor had not provided constitutionally adequate
notice, and that the debtor did not have the opportunity to be heard
prior to the seizure.187
During this time, the Court addressed the disadvantages that the
poor faced in the legal system and established extra protections for
indigent parties.188 The ruling in Sniadach was consistent with several
other Supreme Court decisions from the period. The Court’s
reasoning in Sniadach emphasized that wages are a “specialized”
property interest for which unjust garnishment can lead to uniquely
detrimental consequences.189 Under this reasoning, the Court created
181. The Sniadach tetrad refers to a series of four cases: Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601 (1975). Beale, supra note 179, at 1603 & n.3.
182. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
183. Id. at 337–38.
184. Id. at 338–39.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 342 (“Where the taking of one’s property is so obvious, it needs no
extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing this
prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due
process.” (citation omitted)).
187. Id. at 340.
188. See Beale, supra note 179, at 1609–10; supra note 180.
189. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340 (“We deal here with wages—a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.”).
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a “hardship” exception to the procedural due process doctrine.190 The
Court designed this exception to heavily favor indigent debtors
because it recognized that such individuals can suffer “grave injustices”
from even a temporary deprivation of wages.191
A few years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin,192 the Court struck down
statutes for prejudgment replevin in Florida and Pennsylvania.193 The
debtors in the consolidated cases were consumers who had purchased
household items under conditional sales contracts, and in each case
the sellers later obtained summary writs of replevin to recollect on
the items after late payments or disputes arose.194 The Florida statute
authorized a state agent to seize property after a court clerk issued a
writ of replevin based on a creditor’s ability to “fill in the blanks” on a
form and post a security bond.195 The statute did require the initiator
of the replevin action to commence an action for repossession at a
later date.196 In Pennsylvania, a claimant could make a similarly basic
application for a writ of replevin, but that statute did not require a
hearing on the merits of the repossession.197
The Court found that both statutes lacked procedural due process
protections because neither provided adequate notice nor the
opportunity for a “meaningful” hearing before allowing collectors to
seize the property.198 The debtor would only receive notice of the
claim at the same moment the items were seized from her.199 Each
state’s procedures allowed courts to issue writs on “bare assertion[s],”
and Pennsylvania did not even require that courts provide an
eventual hearing.200
Relying on Sniadach, the Court found that even though the seizures
were temporary in nature, a “nonfinal” deprivation was still a

190. Id.
191. Id. at 340; see Beale, supra note 179, at 1608 (noting the tremendous leverage
creditors would gain over debtors in collecting the alleged debt).
192. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
193. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96–97.
194. Id. at 70–71. One of the appellants in the case had a more “bizarre”
experience—Rosa Washington’s former husband, a local deputy sheriff, had
obtained a writ in order to seize all of their son’s belongings while the former couple
battled over custody. Id. at 72.
195. Id. at 70–71, 73–74 (noting that the Florida statute did not require an applicant
to make a “convincing showing” that he or she had a claim to the goods in question).
196. Id. at 75.
197. Id. at 77–78.
198. Id. at 69–70, 75, 80–81.
199. Id. at 80–81.
200. Id. at 74, 77.
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deprivation under the due process requirements.201 The Court also
acknowledged that the debtors did not have full legal title to the
goods under the conditional sales contracts but dismissed that fact as
irrelevant.202 At stake was the debtors’ property interest in continued
possession and use of the goods, and the matter of the “ultimate”
right to continued possession would require a later hearing.203
The Court then also rejected a narrow reading of both Sniadach
and Goldberg that limited procedural due process protections to items
of necessity, instead stating that those cases did not restrict
procedural due process guarantees to only wages or welfare
benefits.204 Stating that “a bed may be equally essential . . . for human
beings in their day-to-day lives,” the Court reaffirmed that “property”
is not a narrowly defined concept under due process.205
Following quickly after Fuentes, the Court moved in a seemingly
different direction with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.206 In Mitchell, a
creditor obtained a writ of sequestration on goods it sold to the
debtor and the debtor challenged that the writ violated his due
process rights.207 The creditor alleged that he had a vendor’s lien on
the goods, and that the debtor had defaulted on payments.208 The
Louisiana statute at issue provided a writ of sequestration based on a
verified application to a judge when a creditor could prove a right to
possession, such as through a lien.209 But the statute also included
some protections for debtors. It cautioned against the writ being
conclusive on the issue of ownership by providing the debtor the
opportunity for a hearing to dissolve the writ if the creditor failed to
verify the validity of the information provided in the affidavit.210 It
also called for an immediate post-seizure hearing, bond processes for
both the creditor and the debtor to seek attachments, and judicial
oversight of the entire process.211
In balancing the interests of the debtor and the creditor, the Court
found that both parties had a substantial interest in the property at

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 86–88.
Id.
Id. at 88–90.
Id. at 90.
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 601–03.
Id.
Id. at 605–06.
Id. at 606–07.
See id. at 608, 611, 613, 626.
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stake.212 The Court upheld the statute, finding the creditor’s interest
ultimately outweighed the imposition on the debtor.213 Further, the
Court found that the statute’s procedural protections had provided
adequate “constitutional accommodation[s]” for the debtor against
the risk of an erroneous deprivation.214
The Mitchell Court distinguished the facts before it from Sniadach
and Fuentes in several notable ways. First, the nature of the interest at
stake in Mitchell was significantly different from the interest at stake in
Sniadach.215 In Sniadach, the creditor never previously held a property
interest in the debtor’s wages prior to the garnishment action, whereas
in Mitchell the creditor did hold a property interest in the relevant
goods because it was collecting on a vendor’s lien from a sale of those
goods.216 Second, the Court weighed the differences between a
permanent seizure absent an opportunity to be heard and a temporary
seizure that takes place prior to a hearing, determining that even if the
deprivation in Mitchell was temporary and not permanent as that in
Sniadach, Fuentes still established that even “nonfinal” deprivations
require appropriate procedure.217 Third, where the statutes in
Sniadach and Fuentes contained no measures for judicial oversight, the
statute as issue in Mitchell provided for and required certain court
procedures, which the Court ruled created “alternative safeguards”
that provided adequate due process to both parties.218
The Mitchell Court, however, declined to formulate a bright-line
rule regarding the deprivation of property, temporary or not, prior to
a hearing.219 In doing so, the Court found an “alternative safeguards”
exception to the hardship exception it established in Sniadach, where it
required a hearing prior to deprivation of property.220 Noting the
importance of the distinction between garnishing wages and
recovering personal property that had been sold, the Court found that

212. Id. at 607–10.
213. Id. at 607–08, 618.
214. Id. at 607.
215. Beale, supra note 179, at 1618.
216. Id. at 1617–19. Compare Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340
(1969) (stating that a person has a stronger interest in wages that they earn), with
Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 610 (arguing that a vendor has an equally strong interest in
loaned property to which he previously had title).
217. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 609–10; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74–75 (1972);
Beale, supra note 179, at 1619.
218. Beale, supra note 179, at 1618.
219. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91–93; Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341.
220. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86; Beale, supra note 179, at 1620.
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the statutory provision of adequate oversight by the judicial system in
Mitchell ensured that the due process requirements were met.221
The Court’s decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc.222 the following year further complicated its stance on due
process requirements in a private seizure action.223 The facts in DiChem were analogous to those in Sniadach, with a creditor in Georgia
seeking to garnish the debtor’s wages to satisfy a debt on goods
sold.224 The Georgia garnishment statute allowed the creditor to seek
a garnishment order so long as the garnishment order was filed
concurrently with an indebtedness action.225 Based on an affidavit
from the creditor asserting the debt, the court clerk issued a
summons of garnishment.226 The Court found that the statute
violated the debtor’s procedural due process rights because the
statute allowed the garnishment based only on the creditor’s
assertions filed with a clerk, not a judge.227 Further, the garnishment
did not allow for a hearing to resolve the matter of possession prior
to resolution of the litigation.228
The Court’s reasoning drew on all three of the previous cases on
property deprivation in a private action. The Court disregarded the
lower court’s interpretation of Sniadach as a “carve[d] out . . .
exception” for wage earners, chiding the lower court for failing to
consider the holding in Fuentes in its reasoning.229 The Court
reiterated the rule in Fuentes, that whether a debtor is entitled to a
hearing does not hinge on the length or severity of a deprivation of
property rights, even when those rights are merely for use and
possession of the property at issue.230 Lastly, the Court determined
that the Georgia statute contained none of the judicial safeguards
found in the statute in Mitchell, such as review of the order by a judge
and the availability of a hearing immediately after the seizure.231 The
Court did not revisit the issue of balancing creditor and debtor
interests in private collection suits until the 1990s in Connecticut v.
Doehr.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 610; Beale, supra note 179, at 1618.
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
Id. at 608.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 606–07.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 605–06.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607; Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 606 (1974).
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Connecticut v. Doehr: Updated procedural due process
requirements for pre-judgment garnishment actions

The Court ruled again on the constitutionality of a state statute
that permitted creditors to attach property before obtaining a
judgment in Connecticut v. Doehr.232 The question in Doehr was what
procedures a state statute had to contain when a creditor utilized the
justice system to deprive a debtor of their property through prejudgment attachment.233 As it did in Di-Chem, the Court looked at the
relevant statute for judicial safeguards similar to those present in
Mitchell, regarding the existence of such protections as a significant
factor for upholding the statute because they would indicate
sufficient due process protection.234
In its decision in Doehr, the Court acknowledged that due process,
“unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”235 Guided by
this instruction that courts may incorporate flexibility into a due
process analysis, the Doehr Court applied a modified version of the
Mathews test.236 The key difference between the version of the test
applied in Doehr and that applied in Mathews was the Court’s focus on
the interest of the private party seeking the attachment (the
creditor), instead of the government’s interest.237 In Doehr, the court
looked with “due regard [at] any ancillary interest the government
may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden
of providing greater protections.”238
232. 501 U.S. 1, 4 (1991). Under the statute at issue in Doehr, creditors could
attach the debtor’s property based solely on a verified oath from the creditor
demonstrating probable cause of a valid claim. Id. at 7. Attachment did not require
prior notice or a hearing. Id. at 4. The debtor in Doehr never received service of the
complaint or notice of the attachment until the sheriff actually attached the
property. Beale, supra note 179, at 1628.
233. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 9.
234. Id. at 10. The Doehr Court noted that in Mitchell, the statute provided for an
immediate post-deprivation hearing in addition to potential damages; a judge was
required to determine whether the creditor provided a “clear showing of entitlement
to the writ” and that the required affidavit provided adequate detail. Id.; Beale, supra
note 179, at 1629.
235. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
236. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11. The traditional application of the Mathews test applies to
a deprivation by the state of a state entitlement. Id. The facts in Doehr were found to
meet the requirement for state action that triggers a due process analysis. Id. at 10–11.
237. Beale, supra note 179, at 1630.
238. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added).
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Of note, the deprivation at risk in Doehr was neither a complete
physical deprivation nor a permanent deprivation.239 The Court also
highlighted that the “one-sided, self-serving, and conclusory
submissions” the creditor had submitted in seeking an attachment were
likely to lead to an erroneous deprivation absent effective judicial
review.240 In looking at what protections the statute did offer for
debtors, the Court identified post-attachment notice and hearing, in
addition to possible double damages for the aggrieved party if the
lawsuit was commenced absent probable cause.241 However, the Court
also found that certain factors present in Mitchell were not present in
Doehr, including the creditor’s preexisting property interest and that the
claim for a vendor’s lien necessarily included documents demonstrating
the creditor’s interest.242 The Court held that if the creditor was only
seeking to guarantee the availability of the attached assets in the event
that he secured a judgment, the creditor’s interest in the property could
not “justify the burdening” of the debtor’s interest.243 The emphasis that
the Court placed on whether a creditor has a preexisting property right
was substantial, as it was included in two prongs of the Mathews test:
determining the importance of the creditor’s interest and ensuring
the validity of the lawsuits outcome.244

239. Id. at 12 (“[E]ven the temporary or partial impairments to property rights
that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due
process protection.”); see also Beale, supra note 179, at 1631 (“The attachment [in
Doehr] may be less injurious than a temporary deprivation of necessary household
goods and wages.”).
240. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14; see also Beale, supra note 179, at 1631 n.218
(“[A]uthoriz[ing] attachment merely because the plaintiff believes the defendant is
liable, or because the plaintiff can make out a facially valid complaint, would permit
the deprivation of the defendant’s property when the claim . . . rested on factual
allegations that were sufficient to state a cause of action but which the defendant
would dispute, or in the case of a mere good-faith standard, even when the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”).
241. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13–14.
242. Id. at 15; see also Beale, supra note 179, at 1632 n.220 (noting the ambiguity in
the Doehr Court’s reasoning when it did not elaborate on what protections are
required to uphold the constitutionality of a statute).
243. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 16.
244. Id. The Court also found a historical underpinning for its argument: the
“Custom of London” entitled plaintiffs to attach property only when the satisfaction
of a judgment was threatened by a defendant’s actions. Id. at 16–17.
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II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO POST-JUDGMENT DEBTOR
GARNISHMENT IN MISSOURI
The Supreme Court established that due process requires
adjudication that is preceded by notice and an opportunity to be
heard, as “appropriate to the nature of the case.”245 In relation to
post-judgment garnishments in Missouri, a court must first establish
that a protected interest exists.246 Upon finding a constitutionally
protected interest, a court can then determine whether the due
process protections that a statute provides are adequate.247
A. Improperly Garnished Wages in Missouri Are a Constitutionally Protected
Property Interest
To invoke a due process protection analysis, a debtor must
establish that he or she was deprived of “life, liberty, or property.”248
The question that invariably arises for a debtor invoking a due
process analysis is, “What qualifies as a constitutionally protected
interest?”249 While there is a potential claim that garnishment
deprives debtors of a liberty interest,250 the stronger and more viable
argument in Missouri is that wage garnishment deprives debtors of
“property.” Unrestrained access to funds to which a debtor is legally
entitled creates a clear and substantial property interest.251 Because
judgment-creditors may legally seek up to a quarter of any individual
paycheck and can sometimes seize an entire bank account, the

245. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also
Doehr, 501 U.S. at 26 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (supporting adjudication on a
case-by-case basis when determining the constitutionality of attachment statutes);
Beale, supra note 179, at 1637.
246. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972) (“When protected
interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”).
247. Id.
248. Id.; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
249. Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property”, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405,
410 (1977).
250. A debtor in Missouri could potentially frame the argument as a deprivation
of a liberty interest given the hardships that garnishment imposes on a person’s
livelihood. See generally Liberty, supra note 140, at 284 (identifying the modern debtcollection industry’s similarities with “the system of state facilitated peonage” in the
post-Civil War South, which presents a modern violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment). That argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
251. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 58 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding a “very
compelling” debtor interest in funds for subsistence).
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judgment-debtor can be unjustly deprived of his own funds and can
quickly lose the ability to “cover basic living expenses.”252
Much like the special protections that may be required for certain
property interests, as noted in Goldberg, the funds to which judgmentdebtors are legally entitled require more safeguarding than current
process affords.253 Although no absolute ownership interest inheres
in funds a person expends and currently owes to a debt collector, the
key distinction that creates a protected interest is that in many cases
the judgment-debtor is legally entitled to the funds garnished by the
judgment-creditor.254 For instance, a debt collector may enter a timebarred claim, fail to validate and verify the debtor’s ownership of the
debt, improperly communicate notice to the debtor, or make any
number of the violations that debt collectors routinely commit.255 In
the alternative, a judgment-debtor may qualify for an exemption that
affords statutory protection from garnishment to a portion of their
wages.256 When a debtor is legally entitled to retain even a portion of
their funds under any of the reasoning above, a garnishment deprives
that debtor of a legitimate and substantial interest in her property.
The ills felt by low-income Missourians who are burdened with a
garnishment are of the same sort as the problems that facilitated the
discussion in Sniadach.257 Data demonstrates that courts typically
impose the highest rates of garnishments on earners in the $25,000252. See Kiel, supra note 138 (hearing from a debtor who had allegedly accrued
$40,000 in debt, almost exclusively in interest, and faced the grim prospects of either
declaring bankruptcy or making payments for the rest of her life); supra notes 132–
33 (reviewing the ability of debt collectors to legally wipe out an entire bank account
under current federal law).
253. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (“The extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to
which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss’ . . . .”).
254. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (highlighting the common judgmentcreditor practice of instituting suits barred by the applicable statute of limitations to
capitalize on the typical debtor’s lack of legal counsel).
255. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text (listing the litigation strategies
of debt buyers that result in wrongful debt-collection suits being filed).
256. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text (describing the Missouri headof-household exemption). But see infra notes 288–90 and accompanying text (noting
that the lack of information provided to debtors regarding exemptions is a cause of
their underutilization).
257. In the St. Louis area specifically, “generations of discrimination” have limited
low-income black families’ access to the range of resources one turns to when faced
with a financial downturn. See FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 7 (grappling with
the violence in St. Louis that, in part, finds its origin in the cycle of economic poverty
in the region); Editorial Board, supra note 1; Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“I’m in a
generational hole.”).
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$40,000 range, and that garnishment rates are high even in the lower
income brackets.258 When a person’s income falls in a lower bracket,
the bulk of their income goes towards “basic necessities,” such as
rent, food, and utilities.259 Adding garnishment to the equation
forces a debtor even further into the proverbial hole and “hits [the]
household budget like a bomb.”260 The Court in Sniadach focused on
the “grave injustices” that result when creditors garnish a
“specialized” property prior to a debtor’s opportunity to be heard.261
In Sniadach, the Court recognized that indigent populations with
little to no access to legal aid feel certain property interest
deprivations far more acutely than their higher-income
counterparts.262
The deprivation of the interest at stake is
exacerbated by the extreme harm to a household that results when a
low-income judgment-debtor in Missouri is deprived of funds to
which she should legally retain access.
B. Debt Collection Practices in Missouri Deny Low-Income Communities
Adequate Notice and the Opportunity to Be Heard
The current patchwork of laws governing Missouri debt-collection
practices, both in and out of the courtroom, lack the adequate
procedural due process safeguards to protect debtors from lowincome communities.
Unfortunately, it is precisely these
communities that are subject to the majority of judgments in debtcollection suits.263 Further, in the greater St. Louis area, low-income
mostly black communities find themselves far more afflicted by debtcollection judgments and garnishments than their non-black majority
counterparts.264
Debt collectors have evaded due process
requirements to provide adequate notice of the claims or the
protections to which debtors are entitled, as well as to provide an
opportunity to be heard, in part due to ingrained societal blocks for
low-income families to access to counsel and legal advice.265
258. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
262. Id.
263. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
264. See supra Section I.A (covering the economic and societal ills black
communities in St. Louis face and the burdens that mount when debt-collection
judgments result in the garnishment of wages).
265. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (“There’s no more income, there’s no
more savings, and the options are pretty limited, because you don’t have the social
network, you don’t have the legal . . . resources available to you to find a solution.”).
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1.

Inadequate notice
Together, both the FDCPA and Missouri law fail to ensure that lowincome households receive constitutionally adequate notice of debtcollection suits.266 When Missouri courts adjudicate the sufficiency of
notice in a debt-collection law suit, they refer to either to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure267 or to the Missouri court rules that govern
the service of summons.268 The application of standard federal or
state service requirements becomes problematic when debtors rarely
remain in the same residence they were living in when they first
incurred the debt.269 Moreover, residents are oftentimes forced to
move from home to home for reasons beyond their control, such as
escalating violence or habitability concerns.270 Judgment-debtors in
the St. Louis area report never receiving service on the debtcollection suits brought against them.271 Much like the case in
Fuentes, where the debtor did not receive notice of the action until
the actual seizure of property, some debtors in St. Louis may not even
266. While related, the issue of providing debtors notice via service of process is
distinct from the legal requirements of the FDCPA that regulate debt collectors’
provision of a validation notice to consumers over the collection of debt; however,
similar concerns arise in both instances regarding verification of who the debt
actually belongs to. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012); supra Section I.A.1 (reviewing the
statutory requirements of the FDCPA); see also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449–
50 (1982) (holding that the opportunity to be heard is only as effective as the notice
preceding it, and establishing that service of process requires notice to be
“reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”);
Johnny Parker, The Search for Meaning in the Notice Requirements of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act: A 30 for 30 Short, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 201, 201 (2015) (assessing the
protections afforded to consumers under the validation of debts section of the
FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g).
267. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (dictating the required procedures for effecting service
of an original complaint).
268. MO. R. R.C.P. §§ 54.01–54.22 (2016).
269. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (discussing four separate residents of the St.
Louis area, each of whom have had to move since their initial encounters with
creditors or debt collectors). Rapidly changing where one lives introduces new
complications into a court’s analysis of whether service has been effected on the
proper place of residence. See Nat’l Dev. Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 930 F.2d 253,
257 (2d Cir. 1991).
270. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
271. The demonstrated lack of awareness that debtors have that a suit has been
levied against them indicates that service has not been reasonably calculated to
provide adequate notice under Greene. See Greene, 456 U.S. at 451; Kiel & Arnold,
supra note 4 (reporting on a couple whose court file reflects that a summons was left
at their current house, even though the house was uninhabited and undergoing
renovations at the time).
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know that a court has rendered a judgment against them until they
begin to see a deduction in their paycheck.272 The current federal
and state procedures governing service of process fail to adequately
account for the particularized housing circumstances that plague
many low-income communities in St. Louis.
Debt collectors’ failure to adhere to the validation requirements of
the FDCPA also contributes to the problem of inadequate notice.273
Under the FDCPA, debt collectors must validate a debt in a written
notice to the debtor prior to engaging in any collection activities.274
If debt collectors do not provide such validation notices, they are
already engaging in unfair practices for which they could be held
liable.275 If debt collectors were to comply with the FDCPA’s
provision on validation, they would be placing debtors on
constructive notice that the debts were in collection, thereby partially
alleviating the concerns that arise during the service of process of a
debt-collection claim. However, if many debtors are not even aware
that they have a debt in collection, then debt collectors are clearly
not strictly adhering to the validation notice requirements.276
Additionally, Missouri courts do not protect debtors from claims
that should be barred due to a faulty pleading.
Inaccurate
information about who holds a debt should bar a suit from even
reaching an inquiry into whether the creditor provided adequate
notice. Yet, creditors and debt collectors often serve process on suits
that should not proceed.277 The current pleading requirement for a
debt-collection lawsuit in a Missouri court sets a very low bar; there
272. See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text (recounting that the replevin
orders in Fuentes were issued simultaneously with the filing of the collection actions,
but the debtors had not yet received a summons); NEW ECONOMY PROJECT, DEBT
DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME
NEW YORKERS 1–2 (2010) (sampling 451 New York residents sued by debt buyers, 71%
of who reported either never being served or served improperly).
273. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012).
274. Id. § 1692g(a)(1)–(5) (including information such as the amount and the
name of the original creditor).
275. Id. § 1692k.
276. See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 7 (“Many consumers are not
aware that they have debts in collections until they . . . review their credit reports.”);
see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB Considers Debt Collection Rules (Nov. 6,
2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-considers-debt-collectionrules (“Consumers are complaining about only becoming aware of a collection
account when they find it on their credit report . . . .”).
277. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text (listing the various deficiencies
in the filing practice of debt buyers that should result in a suit being barred); see also
Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
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are no additional or specialized statutory requirements placed on
collection suits.278 Debt collectors frequently succeed in obtaining
judgments against debtors based on minimal evidence that the
debtor actually owes the debt.279
The lack of adequate notice to protect against a defective claim
being filed against a debtor mirrors the due process failures of the
statutes the Court found unconstitutional in Fuentes.280 In Fuentes, the
state courts had routinely issued writs of replevin based upon
affidavits containing “bare assertion[s],”—debt collectors needed
only to state their entitlement to the property in a “conclusory
fashion” for a clerk to issue a writ.281 The same situation is playing
out in courtrooms across Missouri. Debt collectors are able to bring a
claim, issue a summons, succeed in a suit, and obtain a garnishment
order based solely on the paltry information provided by the debt
collector regarding whether the debtor being sued actually owns the
debt, regardless of whether it is within the statute of limitations.282
Much like the “bare assertion[s]” alleged in Fuentes that ultimately led
to unjust garnishments, debt collectors in Missouri often assert claims
based on often erroneous and unverified information, leading to
similarly unjust garnishments.283 Proper adherence to the validation
requirements would place debtors on notice that a false claim is

278. MO. R. R.C.P. § 55.22 (2016) (“When a claim or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, the same may be pleaded according to legal effect, or may be
recited at length in the pleading, or a copy may be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit.”); see also Letter from Attorney Gen. of Mo. to Hon. Lisa White Hardwick
(Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Attorney General’s Letter], https://ago.mo.gov/docs/de
fault-source/press-releases/2015/debtcollectionpractices.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (lamenting the
repeated failure of debt buyers to provide adequate proof of ownership of a debt
when filing a claim, despite a ruling from the Missouri Supreme Court that expressly
required debt buyers to demonstrate a clear chain of assignment in order to have
standing to bring a collection claim (citing CACH, LLC v. Askew, 358 S.W.3d 58, 65
(Mo. 2012))).
279. See HUMAN RIGHTS Watch, supra note 61, at 45; Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
280. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
281. Id. at 74.
282. See supra Section I.B (examining the practices of debt buyers, including
liability disclaimers and robo-signing, that result in very little information about a
debt being transmitted during the sale of a debt portfolio, yet indicating the outsized number of collection suits that debt buyers bring each year based on that
information).
283. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 75. Further, as in Fuentes where the debtor had no chance
to rebut the claim because the garnishment was effected pre-judgment, debtors in
Missouri also do not have the chance to contest the allegation because of inadequate
opportunity to be heard due to the failures in the process. Id. at 82–83.

CONSTANTINEAU.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

FAIR FOR WHOM?

12/15/2016 3:29 PM

523

being filed against them, and also enable the debtor to halt the
collection process prior to the commencement of a suit.
Time-barred debt, or so-called “zombie debt,”284 is another method
through which debt collectors are securing judgments based on lessthan-ethical practices.285 Creditors often bring debt-collection suits
after the statute of limitations has run, but debtors are largely
unaware that a statute of limitations even exists.286 That debt
collectors continue to bring these claims, even when counsel is
present on the opposing side, demonstrates the willingness of the
debt-collection industry to resurrect old debts.287
Missouri creditors are also not providing debtors with adequate
notice regarding possible exemptions. There is a demonstrated gap
in awareness among the low-income debtor population in Missouri
regarding qualifications for the head-of-household exemption to
garnishment.288 Currently, the burden falls on the debtor to assert
the exemption in court,289 but even when debtors appear, they
generally lack counsel or knowledge of the exemption.290 Notice of a
debt-collection action should contain explicit instructions on how
debtors can obtain an exemption to which they legally are entitled.291
The current practice of providing notice that is lacking clear,

284. Sobol, supra note 94, at 327–28; KUEHNHOFF & SAUNDERS, supra note 97, at 2
(offering suggestions on how to prevent time-barred debts from being revived).
285. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at 45 (charging that the practice of
initiating suits to collect time-barred debts is a clear violation of the FDCPA).
286. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
287. Id.; Sobol, supra note 94, at 346 (“Despite prohibitions on threatening or
filing lawsuits, collectors continue to threaten legal action, file lawsuits, and obtain
judgments (primarily default judgments) on time-barred debts. In the majority of
states, the passage of the limitations period is an affirmative defense that the debtor
must raise. As a practical matter, alleged debtors rarely raise this defense, since most
lawsuits result in default judgments.”).
288. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5; Kiel & Arnold, supra note 4 (identifying
service of process requirements that allow debtors to request a hearing when they are
incorrectly identified as “not head of a family,” but noting that the notice does not
include information indicating that correct identification as head of a family will lead
to a reduction in the garnishment by close to half).
289. See Kiel, supra note 141 (referencing the lack of “clear notice” provided to
debtors regarding the head of family exemption, and the burden that falls on the
debtors to assert the exemption); supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining
the head-of-household exemption requirements).
290. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (reporting that the mayor of Jennings,
Missouri, was initially unaware that there was a head-of-household exemption that
could have offered her some protection from overzealous debt collectors).
291. Kiel, supra note 141.
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readable language on exemption requirements fails to adequately
protect low-income debtors from an unfair property deprivation.
2.

Lack of opportunity to be heard
In the St. Louis area, less than 8% of debtors have counsel present
in debt-collection suits that move to the judgment stage, and for
debtors in mostly black low-income communities, that number drops
to 4%.292 While debtors are not constitutionally entitled to counsel in
civil matters such as debt-collection suits,293 the limited access that
low-income communities have to legal advice places them at a far
greater risk of being deprived of the opportunity to be heard prior to
a post-judgment garnishment.294 This issue echoes the Court’s
concerns in both Goldberg and Sniadach regarding the inability of lowincome debtors to obtain access to legal advice.295 Debtors can
appear in court to contest a debt or to negotiate reduced rates of
repayment with the creditor.296 However, the high incidence of
default judgments issued against residents in low-income
communities in St. Louis suggests that debtors are not pursuing these
two advantageous and lawful avenues for resolution of the claim.297
Another similarity to the limited access to counsel in Missouri can
be found in a comparison with Fuentes. In Fuentes, the Court held that
procedures that do not provide a debtor with an opportunity to rebut
a creditor’s garnishment claim are inadequate because they do not
provide a “real test” of the issue.298 The same problem presents in
Missouri. Debtors either do not have notice of a suit, do not
understand the service of process they have received, or simply do

292. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
293. Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (stating that the right
to counsel is only automatic in instances when a defendant’s physical liberty is at
stake; in alternative situations, a court is to apply the balancing test established in
Mathews); see also id. at 27 (holding that an indigent woman was not entitled to
counsel in a civil proceeding, despite a substantial interest in the potential
termination of her parental status).
294. See Kiel & Arnold, supra note 2 (reporting that only 3% of Missouri debtors
sued by a hospital collection agency had legal representation); Kiel & Waldman,
supra note 5 (referring to the barriers that prevent low-income black communities
from having equal access to legal advice in Missouri).
295. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–64 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1969).
296. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
297. Id.
298. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96, 97 (1972).
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not recognize the legal nature of the action.299 This lack of
appreciation for the situation at hand, coupled with limited legal
resources, often results in a default judgment. These limitations
create the same situation as in Fuentes, where the debtors were denied
any chance to contest a taking prior to a hearing on the merits, if at
all. In St. Louis, when a debt-collection action proceeds to a
garnishment—typically through a default judgment—the debtor has
likely never had an opportunity to engage in the legal action. The
comparison with Fuentes is strengthened by the permanent nature of
garnishment in comparison to the temporary property at issue in
Fuentes.300 Low-income communities in St. Louis are thus being
deprived of an opportunity to be heard, and this is directly related to
the community’s lack of access to counsel.
The disadvantages created by the inability to obtain or afford legal
advice in low-income communities in St. Louis runs counter to the
sentiment expressed by the Court in Sniadach.301 The “hardship”
exception created by the Sniadach Court aimed to prevent “grave
injustices” from befalling indigent debtors.302 The Court noted that
where wages are at stake, a rule that satisfies procedural due process
in other contexts may not withstand scrutiny.303 While the Court in
Mitchell later narrowed the exception to exclude temporary
deprivations of property, the deprivations at stake in Missouri are not
temporary.304 The key distinction between the results in Missouri and
the narrowing of the decision in Mitchell that makes the “hardship”

299. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (explaining that the lack of debtors’
understanding of the legal nature of debt-collection lawsuits coupled with the scarce
legal options available to them embolden judgment-creditors to file non-meritorious
suits).
300. Compare Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 84 (clarifying that the Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes at issue afforded a person the ability to institute an action to recover what
had been replevied prior to a post-seizure hearing and final judgment), with Kiel &
Waldman, supra note 5 (noting the disproportionate and likely irreparable impact a
garnishment judgment of up to a quarter of a worker’s after-tax pay has on lowerincome debtors).
301. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1969).
302. Id. at 340 (reviewing the harms that befall a family when wages are
garnished).
303. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974); Sniadach, 395 U.S. at
340–42 (“The result is that a prejudgment garnishment . . . may as a practical matter
drive a wage earning family to the wall.”).
304. See Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 617–20 (explaining that the degree of danger
resulting from a mistaken seizure is offset by documentary requirements and the
temporary nature of the potentially wrongful seizure); see supra Section I.A
(chronicling the effects of wage garnishment in Missouri).
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exception relevant is the permanence of wage garnishment.305 In
majority black communities in Missouri, where access to legal advice
is either unavailable or unaffordable, the current wage garnishment
procedures do not meet due process requirements under the
“hardship” exception.306 Even a small reduction in weekly take-home
pay can have an outsized effect on a low-income family’s ability to
survive in the St. Louis area.307
C. Application of the Modified Mathews-Doehr Test
The modified Mathews-Doehr test demonstrates that low-income
debtors in Missouri have a more compelling interest in retaining the
funds to which they are legally entitled than judgment-creditors have
in executing a wage garnishment. The test is the most appropriate
vehicle for courts to ensure that debt collectors in St. Louis, Missouri,
respect the due process rights of debtors because it allows courts to
weigh the various interests at stake in debt-collection actions between
two private parties.308 The traditional Mathews test does not align
perfectly with this sort of proceeding because the traditional
application of the test balances a deprivation initiated by the
government, not by a private actor.309 However, the modified version
of the test that the Court applied in Doehr is appropriate in the
Missouri scenario, despite the focus of Doehr being a pre-judgment,
versus a post-judgment, attachment.
First, the debt-collection
litigation occurs between two private parties who each have a claim to
the property interest, as was the case in all of the Sniadach tetrad cases
and Doehr. Second, the circumstances in Missouri mirror the
property disputes brought in Doehr and the Sniadach tetrad, where
wages and property assets were seized prior to a hearing as lowincome Missourians deficient notice and lack of an opportunity to be
heard are analogous to a pre-hearing situation.

305. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340 (emphasizing the potential for irreparable harm
associated with a wrongful pre-judgment imposition of wage garnishment); Mitchell,
416 U.S. at 618 (finding the Louisiana statute constitutional because it sought to
“protect[] the debtor’s interest in every conceivable way”).
306. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340; supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text
(citing the “pernicious” gap in access to resources in mostly black communities).
307. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340; FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 11–12
(linking the cycle of poverty in the region to the ongoing violence in St. Louis).
308. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1991).
309. Allen C. Myers, Note, Untangling the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits from
Freezes, Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 371, 395–96 (2009) (reviewing
the application of the Mathews test to garnishment cases involving federal benefits).
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The Mathews-Doehr test, therefore, correctly balances the following
interests: (1) the protected interest of the debtor in improperly
garnished wages, (2) the debt collector’s property interest in reclaiming
an outstanding debt, (3) the government interest in efficient and
effective judicial proceedings, and (4) the veracity interest that ensures
against the erroneous deprivation of a protected interest.310
The modified test provides an appropriate structure to balance (1)
the competing private interests (the debtor and the creditor) at stake
in the disputed property, with (2) the government’s interest, and (3)
the risks and rewards advanced by competing procedural processes.311
Application of the modified balancing test demonstrates that debtors
hold a substantial private interest in their garnished wages and that
judgment-creditors, conversely, do not have a significant private
interest in obtaining the entire judgment awarded in debt collection
actions. Moreover, the fact that the government will not suffer from
excessively increased administrative burdens in debt collection
lawsuits in Missouri if more protection is afforded to debtors, coupled
with the substantial risk inherent in erroneously awarding a judgment
to debt collectors under current Missouri law, further bolsters the
argument for enhanced protections for debtors.
1. Judgment-debtors in Missouri have a substantial private interest in
garnished wages
Under the Mathews-Doehr test, a court will consider the
substantiality of the debtor’s private interest and will then evaluate
that interest in relation to the competing interests of the private party
creditor and the government.312 A final piece of the balancing test is
to weigh those competing interests against the risk of an erroneous
deprivation under the current procedures.

310. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 (“We now consider the Mathews factors in
determining the adequacy of the procedures before us with regard to the safeguards
of notice and a prior hearing . . . .”); supra notes 236–44 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of the Mathews test in Doehr); see also infra notes 312–40 (applying
the Mathews-Doehr test to the Missouri debt-collection crisis).
311. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10 (“Here the inquiry is similar, but the focus is
different.”); Beale, supra note 179, at 1644 (“[T]he Court’s modification of Mathews
in Doehr represents an appropriate shift in the due process calculus . . . .”). In Doehr,
a prejudgment attachment statute was held as unconstitutional when the Court
determined that the risk of an erroneous deprivation to the debtor was too great
where the statute did not require notice or prior hearing or bond, and no adequate
safeguards were in place. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12.
312. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12.
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The private interest that debtors in Missouri have in retaining their
earned income is substantial, and too often creditors deprive debtors
of their rightful income. For instance, a low-income debtor is likely
eligible for an exemption, but that debtor generally has no knowledge
that he or she must assert the protection.313 The resulting deprivation
can severely impact the ability of the household to function.314
Additionally, a debt collector must meet the FDCPA’s requirements
for validating debts with the creditor and communicating debts to
consumers.315 If a debt collector brings a suit against a debtor based
on a non-validated debt, then the debt collector has brought that suit
in error, and the debtor suffers yet another unjust deprivation of
funds.316 The FDCPA imposes liability on debt collectors that bring a
suit without complying with the statutory requirements.317 However,
debt collectors that wrongfully seize funds after securing a judgment
from an improperly filed suit are rarely held accountable for their
actions.318 A seizure of this sort is a clear and substantial deprivation
of property. The communities in Missouri that are the most
impacted by these practices can see unforgiving consequences from
the resulting garnishment.319
The Court has repeatedly noted the substantial interest in
protecting income in cases dealing with a deprivation of property that
is essential to a person’s survival. For example, in Goldberg, the Court
recognized the great import of maintaining access to welfare benefits
that families survive on.320 Similarly, in Sniadach, one of the early
cases addressing pre-judgment garnishment, the Court recounted the
“tremendous hardship” imposed on families who see a reduction in
313. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (referring to the burden that falls
on debtors to assert that an exemption applies).
314. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (interviewing debtors who are constantly
plagued by worries about how they will provide for their families).
315. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692g (2012).
316. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 40–45. Debt buyers frequently
bring suits based on debt portfolio purchases that include very limited information
about who owns a debt, and when the suits have not been subjected to rigorous
verification procedures yet result in a default judgment, debtors are stripped of their
rightful property. See id. at 40–45 (emphasizing the negligent practices of debt
buyers that engage in collection litigation).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
318. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 1 (“These problems are often
discovered long after the debt buyers have already won court judgments against
alleged debtors . . . .”).
319. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (detailing the myriad harms that befall
families in St. Louis who are stricken with garnishments).
320. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
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wages.321 In the opinion for Fuentes, the Court equated the loss of
critical household goods to that of the wage and welfare benefit
deprivations in both Sniadach and Goldberg.322 There is an analogous
and similarly weighty property deprivation occurring in Missouri,
where debtors’ access to their rightful income is vital to many
families’ livelihoods.
2. Judgment-creditors do not have a significant private interest in recovering
the entire award in a debt-collection lawsuit
Although judgment-creditors have an interest in retaining the
profits they earn from collecting on debts, that interest is not nearly
as significant as the judgment-debtor’s interest in retaining access to
the same funds. While a weightier interest in favor of the debt
collector may exist when viewing the claims in the aggregate, the
majority of the actions that debt collectors bring in Missouri courts
are for very small sums of money,323 and an undue property
deprivation is evaluated in an analysis specific to the case at hand.324
The volume of claims that most debt collectors pursue ensures a
steady return on the resources they invest in litigation.325 This debt
recovery minimizes the substantiality of the interest and the
likelihood that debt companies would suffer serious losses if courts
barred them from pursing certain suits.
Furthermore, enforcing or enhancing the procedural burdens on
the debt collector at the time of filing would not actually constitute a
deprivation of property for the valid owner of the debt. For instance,
requiring enhanced documentation of proof of validation or
augmented requirements for communication and notice will not
prevent a debt collector from proceeding on a valid claim and
securing a judgment in its favor.326 Such requirements do not
321. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
322. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 89 (1972) (“[A] stove or a bed may be equally
essential to provide a minimally decent environment for human beings in their dayto-day lives. It is, after all, such consumer goods that people work and earn a
livelihood in order to acquire.”).
323. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (alleging that debt collectors typically bring
smaller claims against debtors in majority black communities who have fewer
financial options available to resolve the debt).
324. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(emphasizing that due process must be “appropriate to the nature of the case”).
325. See supra note 84 (citing to several reports on the hundreds of millions of
dollars of revenue that debt collectors see from collection suits).
326. See supra Section II.B (detailing the various barriers to notice and opportunity
to be heard that the low-income communities in Missouri are faced with in debtcollection suits); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77–79 (calling for
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preclude a debtor from eventually repaying a valid debt that a debt
collector is collecting on.327 The additional protections would simply
ensure that the debt is collected in a manner that fully complies with
current regulations, while protecting any funds of interest to the
creditor that the debtor is legally entitled to retain.
The Supreme Court has made clear that when a debtor has a
property interest in her wages, a court should strongly consider the
importance of that interest.328 However, the Court noted in the
Sniadach tetrad and Doehr that whether one or both of the private
parties had a preexisting interest in the property at issue was a critical
determination related to the weight afforded to that party’s claim.329
If the creditor has no preexisting interest in the wages, a court’s
determination of where the greater interest lies weighs heavily in
favor of the debtor.330 This distinction is especially relevant in
lawsuits brought by debt buyers or third-party collectors as opposed
to the original creditor. Debt collectors who were never originally
owed a debt, but who simply purchased the debt from the original
creditor, have no preexisting interest in the property.331 Accordingly,
these third-party debt collectors have a far lower interest relative to
the debtor’s substantial interest in retaining their own wages.
3. Affording judgment-debtors more protection in debt-collection suits will not
create excessive administrative burdens for the government
The government’s interest in ensuring fair and effective debtcollection suits is significantly lower than either the debtor’s private
interest or the debt collector’s property interest. To be sure,
additional safeguards and procedural protections impose some
administrative costs; however, adding procedures or judicial
safeguards to the existing process would likely result in only a slightly

increased burdens to be placed on debt buyers who initiate collection suits in order
to protect the funds to which debtors or wrongfully sued parties are legally entitled).
327. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692g (2012) (outlining creditor requirements for
validating debts and communicating with debtors).
328. See Beale, supra note 179, at 1622 n.148 (citing Laurence Levine, Due Process of
Law in Pre-Judgment Attachment and the Filing of Mechanics’ Liens, 50 CONN. B.J. 335, 345
(1976)) (suggesting that a creditor’s preexisting interest in property was a significant
factor in the Mitchell decision).
329. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991) (finding that a party with no
preexisting interest in property had “too minimal” of an interest to find in his favor);
Beale, supra note 179, at 1632 (reviewing how a creditor’s preexisting interest in a
contested property is “key”).
330. Beale, supra note 179, at 1630–37.
331. Id. at 1622 n.148.
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heightened administrative burden. This burden is already justified by
the time it should be taking courts to verify the accuracy of each
claim.332 Some examples of additional safeguards would be
developing court procedures to ensure that debt collectors provide
valid information to verify their claims and that the claims are not
time-barred. Such additional safeguards or procedural protections
would minimally increase the burden on the government in its role
of adjudicating claims and enforcing judgments.
4. A substantial risk of erroneously depriving a judgment-debtor of wages
exists under current Missouri law
The fourth and final step in the Mathews-Doehr analysis evaluates
the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the current procedures
and the potential value of adding new or alternative procedural
safeguards.333 Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that Missouri’s
current debt-collection procedures pose a substantial risk that courts
will erroneously deprive debtors of their property.334 Debt collectors
frequently ignore the notice and validation requirements of the
FDCPA by providing inaccurate information in their claims.335
Authenticating debt becomes more burdensome when debt buyers
purchase large quantities of debt portfolios that contain minimal or
inaccurate information about who owns the debt or the value of the
debt.336 Debtors are often unrepresented and unaware of their rights,
a problem further compounded by the fact that court clerks may be
the only check on whether debt collectors satisfy verification

332. See supra note 84 (listing various sources reporting that debt buyers file many
thousands of claims for collection each year).
333. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
334. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (interviewing debtors who have an overall
lack of understanding about the suits and garnishments levied against them); Kiel &
Arnold, supra note 4 (reporting on a debtor who did not understand the debtcollection lawsuit process or what was required of him).
335. See CFPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (“The sale and resale of debts
has raised concerns about debt data integrity and information flows from creditor to
debt buyer to subsequent debt buyers.”).
336. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 72, at ii (analyzing a three-year study
that uncovered close to 90 million consumer debt accounts that had been purchased
by debt buyers); Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77 (calculating that debts are sold
with minimal pieces of ownership information attached to them in order for debt
buyers to reap a large profit from unreliable debts); see also supra note 88 (reviling
the practices, such as robo-signing, of debt buyers that allow for so many collection
claims to be brought successfully on the barest of assertions).
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requirements.337 While actual notice is not a strict legal requirement,
debtors have reported never receiving notification of a suit against
them.338 Additionally, in the absence of an attorney, the few debtors
who actually appear in court are unfamiliar with how to proceed and
can be pressured by opposing counsel into giving up their due
process rights.339 Finally, while debt collectors often bring debtors to
court over seemingly minimal amounts, those amounts are not
insignificant for these families.340 Each of these complications alone
produce a significant risk that the debtor will be wrongly deprived of
her property. Taken as a whole, the possibilities for bringing an
erroneous suit are many. If implemented reliably, additional
safeguards to protect debtors could easily overcome these risks.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the existence of a protected property interest, the due
process failures of current procedure in Missouri, and a clear
indication from the Mathews-Doehr test that the debtor’s interest in
earned wages is superior to the debt collector’s, reform is necessary.
The Ferguson Commission addressed the broader racial and
economic inequalities in the St. Louis area, and it seeks to begin a
conversation with the goal of fostering a more peaceful and equitable
place to live.341 The Commission’s approach to community change
and development is communicative and interactive, providing an
instructive starting point in evaluating what constitutes
constitutionally adequate procedural due process protections for the
low-income communities of Missouri.342

337. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77 (suggesting that court systems
should exert greater pressure on debt buyers to file valid claims by increasing the
scrutiny with which current claims are examined, and asking legislatures to fund
programs that will educate and represent low-income debtors who cannot navigate
the system successfully on their own).
338. See supra note 271 (narrating accounts from debtors who saw their wages
garnished when they had no recollection of ever receiving notice that their debt was
in collection).
339. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
340. See supra Section I.A and accompanying text.
341. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 50, at 6–7.
342. Id. (explaining the Commission’s goals to make St. Louis fair, equitable, and
just).
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A. Notice Must Be Tailored to Meet the Needs of Low-Income Communities
in Missouri Whose Debts Are in Collection
As the Court held in Sniadach, even when notice conforms to statutory
requirements, a property deprivation resulting in “hardships,” like those
felt in Missouri communities, can still violate procedural due process if
notice and the opportunity to be heard are not tailored to the
circumstances.343 Notice requirements for debt-collection suits directed
at low-income communities should be tailored to address “all [of the]
circumstances” affecting community members.344
For instance,
landlord-tenant problems, health and safety concerns, or poor
employment opportunities can all force a family to move from city to
city.345 As a result, the addresses that debt collectors have on file can be
out of date, assuming they were even correct in the first place.346 Process
in debt collection suits should be augmented with additional procedures
to ensure that debtors receive adequate notice to protect against the
voluminous amount of suspect judgments entered against low-income
debtors in St. Louis.347 As a final layer of protection against erroneous
judgments, the notice provided to debtors should clearly outline the
procedure for claiming an exemption.
The government of Missouri should work to implement additional
regulations to require debt collectors to meet a higher standard of
pleading when filing debt collection lawsuits.348 Currently, claims can

343. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (addressing the
serious societal harms that result from the “hardship” imposed by the garnishment of
wages).
344. See Green v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1982) (affirming that notice is
best effected when it is “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections”).
345. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342 n.9.
346. See supra note 54 (recounting the stories of people in the St. Louis area who
have been forced to relocate due to circumstances beyond their control); see supra
notes 76–78 and accompanying text (detailing the practices of debt buyers that result
in nominal, often erroneous, amounts of information regarding debt ownership to
be conveyed in debt portfolio sales).
347. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 78 (calling for both debt collectors and
courts to independently provide notice to debtors regarding debt-collection suits).
348. See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 278, at 6 (requesting that the
Missouri Supreme Court Commission on Racial and Ethnic Fairness revise court
rules to “require plaintiffs in lawsuits to collect consumer debt to provide with their
petition documentation of all assignments demonstrating the plaintiff’s right to collect
the debt from the consumer”); accord JON LEIBOWITZ ET AL., FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN
SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 14–
19 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/rep
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be filed based solely on the debt collector’s assertions that a debtor
owes a debt; however, because debt buyers purchase debt in large
portfolios, there is oftentimes no mechanism to verify individual
debts beyond an affidavit claiming that the debt can be traced back to
the original creditor.349
Furthermore, requiring heightened accountability from debt
collectors filing collection claims also addresses the problems caused
by time-barred debts, or “zombie debts.”350 Debt collectors may allege
that debtors have extended the statute of limitations by, for example,
making voluntary payments, and without the debtor present to raise
the affirmative defense, the suit proceeds.351 The Attorney General of
Missouri recently enacted new regulations, one of which begins to
address this problem.352 The new regulation makes any threat to file
or filing of a lawsuit past the statute of limitations unlawful.353 The
other new regulation works to eliminate a loophole that allows debt
collectors to restart the clock on a statute of limitationsreaffirmation.354 Under the regulation, debt collectors cannot “seek
or obtain without valuable consideration” any reaffirmation of a debt
that was previously time-barred.355 The full effect of the new
regulations has yet to be seen, but in furtherance of the Attorney

orts/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-staff-report-repairingbroken-system-protecting/debtcollectionreport.pdf (noting that if states adopted
increased pleading standards similar to those required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8, they could better protect consumers from debt-collection suits both filed
against them in error or without the requisite proof of ownership demonstrated by the
filer); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77 (appealing to state governments to
require debt collectors to provide “meaningful evidence” when filing claims).
349. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text (detailing the frequency with
which debt-collection claims are filed on bare assertions of unverified information); supra
notes 85–94 and accompanying text (reviewing the litigation practices of debt buyers that
rely on sparse amounts of identifying information when filing collection suits).
350. See supra note 284 (defining the increased prevalence of suits filed on timebarred debt claims, or “zombie debt”).
351. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (doubting the validity of a debt collector’s
claim that the statute of limitations in Rosalyn Turner’s collection suit had been
extended because of a voluntary payment when Turner denied such a payment).
352. AG Koster’s Reforms Against Abusive Debt-Collection Practices Effective Today (June
30, 2016, 3:56 PM) [hereinafter AG Koster’s Reforms], https://ago.mo.gov/home/agkoster-s-reforms-against-abusive-debt-collection-practices-effective-today.
353. Id.; MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.100 (2016). The regulation also
makes unlawful the threat to file or filing of any claim that has been discharged by a
bankruptcy court, voided by a court, or deemed satisfied under a debtor-creditor
agreement. § 60-8.100.
354. AG Koster’s Reforms, supra note 352.
355. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.100.
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General’s objectives, courts should also require creditors to
affirmatively offer proof verifying that a collection suit still falls within
the statutory time frame for filing.356
B. Access to Legal Advice Will Ensure that Low-Income Communities in the
St. Louis Area Have the Opportunity to Be Heard
In Missouri debt collection lawsuits, low-income debtors rarely have
legal representation.357 The courtroom is an intimidating place for
any lay person, and debt collection lawsuits in Missouri proceed
under a complex layering of federal statutes and state regulations
that a debtor with “virtually no understanding of the law” will struggle
to navigate.358 While defending against a debt collection suit is more
than just saying some “magic words,”359 debtor’s chances of deploying
an effective defense are slim when they appear pro se.360
An even greater threat to an unrepresented debtor is falling victim
to “hallway conferences.”361 While negotiated settlements between
debtors and debt collectors are, in theory, a positive and proactive
result for all parties involved, the reality is that experienced lawyers
bully debtors into settlements that they do not understand.362 These
356. See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 278, at 7 (charging Missouri courts
to amend the rule governing default judgments to include a requirement that debt
collectors certify a claim is still within the statutory limiting period when filed); accord
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RULES NEEDED TO STOP DEBT COLLECTION ABUSES 1
(2016), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_collection/Debt-Collection-Priorities
-2016.pdf (advocating for a prohibition on the collection of time-barred debt both in
and out of litigation). See generally Sobol, supra note 94 (justifying the need to better
regulate debt-collection actions over “zombie debt” with an analysis of the increasing
prevalence of and problems with time-barred debt).
357. See Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5 (determining that in debt-collection
lawsuits filed in St. Louis between 2008 and 2012, only 8% of defendants had legal
representation, and only 4% of defendants from black communities had such
representation).
358. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 53 (assessing the difficulties that
arise when a layperson attempts to appear unrepresented in a debt-collection suit).
359. Magic Words, THIS AM. LIFE (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.thisamericanlife.org
/radio-archives/episode/532/transcript (covering the proceedings of a debtcollection claim where the debtors caused the debt collector to drop the action by
saying the magic words “show me the evidence”).
360. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 53.
361. See id. at 4 (“Many defendants come to court intending to fight the case
against them but end up capitulating in the courthouse hallways. Some are
persuaded that they have no choice.”); Magic Words, supra note 359 (recounting an
experience where a reporter observed and engaged in a courtroom battle with a
lawyer representing a debt collector who was attempting to pressure a couple into
settling by bringing them out into the hallway to “negotiate”).
362. See Holland, Junk Justice, supra note 77, at 224.
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conferences can easily veer into the realm of coercive and
threatening practices that violate the explicit provisions of the
FDCPA.363 Without any legal knowledge to rely on, debtors are
essentially “[t]hrown to the [w]olves.”364 To alleviate the difficult
situation that many debtors in the low-income communities of St.
Louis find themselves in when unrepresented in a debt-collection
suit, Missouri lawmakers should work to promote legal access for
impoverished debtors.365
C. Additional Financial Protections Are Necessary to Protect Low-Income
Communities in Missouri from the Overly Harsh Practices of Debt Collectors
Congress should update the Credit Consumer Protection Act, the
federal law regulating wage garnishment, to reflect the current
financial climate. Since Congress enacted the CCPA in 1968, the
statute has not kept pace with inflation, and rather than rely on state
law, courts have generally deferred to the CCPA’s regulatory
scheme.366 Lowering the after-tax income amount eligible for
garnishment below its current rate of 25% will protect low-income
debtors who are demonstrably misrepresented in the allocation of
debt collection judgments.367
Interest rate regulation compounds the failures of Missouri’s
regulatory system in protecting low-income households.368 The
interest rates attached to many loans are predatory and often are set
at extraordinarily high levels.369 Not only do debtors face exorbitant
363. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012) (outlining illegal debt-collection practices,
including false representation that nonpayment will result in damaging legal
consequences); supra Section I.A.1 (examining the legal requirements of the FDCPA).
364. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 53.
365. Kiel, supra note 141 (suggesting that many plaintiffs in debt-collection suits in
Missouri, such as utility companies or hospitals, that have an “obligation to serve the
public” offer assistance programs to lower-income debtors and that few have
knowledge of the programs); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 77
(discussing the need for state legislatures to “fund programs that provide
independent legal advice or representation to low-income defendants in debtcollection cases”).
366. “Missouri does not regulate collection agencies . . . .” Debt Collection, supra
note 136.
367. See Kiel, supra note 141 (noting that four states prohibit the use of
garnishment in debt-collection actions for most debts—Texas, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and South Carolina—and arguing that more states need to follow suit
because “low-income workers can’t afford to lose a quarter of their pay”).
368. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing how high predatory loan
interest rates can be, citing to some in the triple digits).
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interest accruing on their loans, but Missouri regulations allow a
judgment-creditor to attach that same interest rate from the original
credit extension contract to the judgment.370 The “exploding debts”
that ensue from such deleterious practices have created cycles of debt
that can be likened to indentured servitude.371
Finally, a loophole in the current law allows debt collectors to seize
a debtor’s entire bank account.372 When a debtor’s paycheck is
eligible for garnishment, the federal law limits creditors from seizing
more than 25%.373 However, if the debtor places that paycheck into a
bank account, the entire contents of that account can be seized, and
in the absence of any statutory language addressing such seizures,
collectors commonly engage in the practice.374 Such seizures severely
constrain debtors’ ability to support themselves financially.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of only a handful of years, Missouri courtrooms
have become infected with uncontrolled and unchecked lawsuits over
the collection of debts. Both the debt-buyer industry’s unbridled
growth in recent years and the outdated federal laws that regulate debt
collection have contributed to the rampant increase in court
judgments that result in garnishment in the St. Louis area. This
increase in garnishments has had a particularly devastating impact on
the low-income communities in St. Louis, especially in majority black
neighborhoods. When faced with the aggressive, and frequently
unlawful, practices of debt collectors, members of these communities
have neither the financial resources to address the debts nor any form
of affordable or accessible legal advice to defend their rights. Debtors
are often unfamiliar with the procedural protections and exemptions

370. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text (referring to the law that
allows contracted rates of interest to be attached at judgment, and noting that the
minimum interest level attached to a judgment in Missouri is 9%).
371. Kiel, supra note 138 (describing a scenario where a debtor’s balance
increased forty times over due to high judgment interest rates); see also Liberty, supra
note 140, at 281 (likening modern debt collection to indentured servitude).
372. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (examining the failure of the
CCPA to address the seizure of funds deposited into a debtor’s bank account).
373. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (stating the legal cap on
garnishment as set by the CCPA).
374. See Kiel, supra note 141 (listing as one “commonsense reform[]” that debtcollection laws should “[r]estrict how much can be taken from debtors’ bank
accounts”); supra notes 132–33 (expounding on the loophole that debt collectors
exploit to seize an entire bank account).
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available to them in debt collection suits. Yet, the current law forces
debtors to bear the burden of asserting these defenses.
The current status of federal and state law regulating debt
collection practices and lawsuits in the state of Missouri violates the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights of
low-income communities. The lawsuits brought by debt collectors
against members of these communities neither provide adequate
notice nor ensure debtors an opportunity to be heard, and the
situation that results is in effect a seizure absent a valid judgment.
Similar to the Supreme Court’s findings in the series of cases
reviewing pre-judgment garnishment statutes, there is a constitutional
violation of due process rights when creditors garnish the wages of
low-income debtors under Missouri’s current regulatory scheme.
The population of St. Louis has seen far more than its fair share of
turmoil in recent years. Underlying the increases in violence, there
emerges a pernicious disparity in the economic treatment of lowincome communities in Missouri, many of which are majority black
communities. The current legal procedures surrounding debt
collection in Missouri works only to aggravate the already pervasive
poverty in the region. A leader of the Ferguson Commission noted,
“If you’re still stuck in this web of indebtedness, you’re not going to
be economically mobile.”375 The choices that a family is forced to
make when they see a post-judgment garnishment seize hundreds of
dollars of their income each week are some of the hardest
imaginable. “That was the worst time in my life,” one woman in
Jennings, Missouri, recalled, “I used to cry myself to sleep.”376

375. Kiel & Waldman, supra note 5.
376. Id.

